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Non–technical Summary
After German unification, Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) were implemented
at a large scale in East Germany in order to prevent unemployment. These programs
mainly consisted of training and temporary employment schemes. In 2002, more
than a decade later, the German Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fu¨r
Arbeit, BA) still spent around e 20 Billion (≈ 0.9% of the GDP) for ALMP. About
50% of this budget goes to East Germany even though the labor force in East
Germany is less than one sixth of Germany as a whole. Quite a significant share
of the labor force in East Germany has been participating in programs of ALMP
since 1990. In light of persistently high unemployment, the effectiveness of ALMP
in East Germany is often questioned.
Contributing to this debate, we estimate the employment effect of public sector
sponsored training programs in East Germany at the individual level for the time
period 1990 to 1999. Training programs were intended to provide skills to the in-
dividuals that are in demand in a market economy but not in sufficient supply due
to the former educational system. Consequently, regarding the number of partic-
ipants, training was the largest ALMP program in East Germany. Our empirical
analysis focusses on the group of individuals who belonged to the active labor force
in 1990. This group was hit fully by the transformation shock. We use data from
the Labor Market Monitor for the state of Sachsen–Anhalt (Arbeitsmarktmonitor
Sachsen–Anhalt LMM–SA).
This paper first provides an overview on training programs in East Germany and de-
velops the methodology for estimating treatment effects of training programs based
on a dynamic employment model. Then, the evaluation of the program involves
estimating separately the effects on the outcome variables transitions between em-
ployment and nonemployment depending on the employment status in the previous
month. When evaluating the average effect of labor market policy for the treated
individuals, it is important to estimate the counterfactual average nontreatment out-
come for the treated individuals based on similar nontreated individuals in order to
avoid a possible bias induced by the selection into the programs. We implement non-
parametric kernel matching based on the estimated propensity score for treatment.
This way, we intend to control for selection bias based on observed characteristics.
In a second step, we take before–after differences in outcomes either using a static
conditional difference–in–differences estimator (CDiD) or – as an innovation in this
paper – a dynamic conditional difference–in–differences estimator in hazard rates
(CDiDHR) to account for a remaining potential selection bias due to time invariant,
unobserved characteristics. We therefore estimate the effect of the program on the
before–after differences in outcomes without explaining their levels.
We argue that estimating CDiDHR is more appropriate since future employment
chances are state dependent, i.e. the probability to be employed in the next month
depends strongly upon whether an individual is employed in the current month. The
literature using CDiD so far has not yet treated employment as a dynamic process.
Another aspect to address is the possibility that before the participation in a labor
market program, the employment situation of the future participants deteriorates
disproportionately (Ashenfelter’s Dip). We take this into account by not using
the situation shortly before the start of the program when doing the before–after
comparison.
Furthermore, there is the possibility of multiple sequential treatments which might
reflect “carousel effects” and which are quite important in the context of a Eu-
ropean welfare state. Carousel effects denote a situation where individuals keep
participating in labor market programs because the programs do not increase their
employment chances but they provide transfer payments to the participants. We ad-
dress this issue by first estimating the effect of training as a first treatment. Then,
we estimate both the incremental effect of a second treatment, which can be an-
other training program or a job creation program, and the combined effect of such
sequences.
Important findings are: Training as a first treatment shows insignificant effects on
the transition rates. The effect of program sequences and the incremental effect of
a second program on the reemployment probability are insignificant. However, the
incremental effect on the probability to remain employed is slightly positive. The
estimated effects do depend heavily on the time the programs took place. Overall,
our results are not as negative as previous results in the literature and it is unlikely
that training on average reduces considerably the future employment chances of
participants. Of course, this is still far from saying that training was a success!
On the methodological side, our study suggests that observed characteristics in the
survey data set used here are not sufficient to control completely for selection into
treatment. In addition, it also shows, that the likely presence of Ashenfelter’s Dip
has to be addressed when implementing a difference–in–differences estimator.
2
Evaluating the Dynamic Employment Effects of
Training Programs in East Germany
Using Conditional Difference–in–Differences ∗
Annette Bergemann+, Bernd Fitzenberger§, Stefan Speckesser&
April 2004
Abstract: This paper evaluates the effects of Public Sponsored Training in East
Germany in the context of reiterated treatments. Selection bias based on observed
characteristics is corrected for by applying kernel matching based on the propensity
score. We control for further selection and the presence of Ashenfelter’s Dip before
the program with conditional difference-in-differences estimators. Training as a first
treatment shows insignificant effects on the transition rates. The effect of program
sequences and the incremental effect of a second program on the reemployment
probability are insignificant. However, the incremental effect on the probability to
remain employed is slightly positive.
Keywords: Evaluation of active labor market policy in East Germany, nonparamet-
ric matching, conditional difference–in–differences, employment dynamics, Ashenfel-
ter’s Dip, bootstrap
JEL classification: C 14, C 23, H 43, J 64, J 68
∗ We are grateful for numerous helpful comments received in seminars at UCL, PSI London, ECB,
the Universities of Essen, Bochum, Tor Vergata, Basel, Bergen, Tu¨bingen, Heidelberg, Bristol,
Humboldt University in Berlin, Mannheim, Erfurt, and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam. We also
benefitted from the comments received at the GAAC–ZEW conference, IZA workshop, “Ausschuß
fu¨r O¨konometrie”, ESEM in Venice, EEA Summerschool 2003, RTN–conference on the Evaluation
of European Labour market Policies 2003, and a CEPR conference on Education Policies 2003. We
especially thank Gerard van den Berg and Ed Vytlacil for their very helpful comments. Thanks
goes also to Thomas Ketzmerick of the ZSH for the provision and help with the data. Annette
Bergemann acknowledges the support by a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Community
Programme ‘EU Training and Mobility of Researcher’ under contract number HPMF-CT-2002-
02047. The usual disclaimer applies.
Corresponding Author: Bernd Fitzenberger, Department of Economics, Goethe–University, PO
Box 11 19 32 (PF 247), 60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, Email: fitzenberger@wiwi.uni-
frankfurt.de
+ University of Mannheim and Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam § Goethe–University Frankfurt,
ZEW, and IFS & University of Mannheim
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Training in East Germany 3
2.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Training under the Labor Promotion Act 1990–1997 . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Changes in Programs and Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.4 Aggregate Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Evaluation Approach 6
3.1 Selection on Observables and Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2 Employment Model and Ashenfelter’s Dip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3 Conditional Difference–in–Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.3.1 Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Employment Rate . . 12
3.3.2 Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Hazard Rates
(CDiDHR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4 Multiple Treatments and Carousel Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 Empirical Analysis 15
4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Implementation of Evaluation Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.3 Specification of Outcome Equation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.4 Estimated Treatment Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4.1 CDiD Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.2 CDiDHR Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5 Conclusions 27
References 29
Appendix 32
1 Introduction
After the formation of the German “Social and Economic Union” in 1990, the East
German economy underwent enormous changes. It had to transform from a com-
mand driven backward economy to a market economy at an unprecedented speed.
The transformation process brought about high unemployment in East Germany.
To increase the employment chances of the unemployed, the German government
decided to provide on a high scale Active Labor Market Policies (ALMP) in East
Germany. These programs mainly consisted of training and temporary employment
schemes. In 2002, more than a decade after the reunification, the German Federal
Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, BA) still spent around e 20 Billion
(≈ 0.9% of the GDP) for ALMP (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, 2003). About 50% of
this budget is spent in East Germany even though the labor force in East Germany
is less than one sixth of Germany as a whole. Quite a significant share of the labor
force in East Germany has been participating in programs of ALMP since 1990.
Contributing to the debate on the effectiveness of ALMP, this paper estimates the
employment effect of public sector sponsored training programs in East Germany
at the individual level for the time period 1990 to 1999. In the early 90s, training
was often considered to be the most effective among the ALMP programs. It was
intended to provide skills that are in demand in a market economy but not in
sufficient supply due to the former educational system. Consequently, regarding the
number of participants, training was the largest ALMP program in East Germany.
In our empirical analysis we focus on the group of individuals who belonged to
the active labor force in 1990. This group was hit fully by the transformation
shock. We use data from the Labor Market Monitor for the state of Sachsen–Anhalt
(Arbeitsmarktmonitor Sachsen–Anhalt LMM–SA), a data set allowing for monthly
information on employment and program participation.
We implement a semiparametric conditional difference–in–differences estimator
(CDiD) (Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd, 1998). In the light of the state depen-
dence of the employment process we extend the CDiD approach to use transition
rates between different labor market states as outcome variables instead of exclu-
sively use employment rates in levels as often done in the literature.
For the implementation of the CDiD estimator, we apply propensity score matching
in the first stage and then estimate average effects of treatment–on–the–treated.
The analysis matches treated individuals to nonparticipants using kernel matching
to account for selection on observables. Selection on time invariant unobservable
characteristics is controlled for using a conditional difference–in–differences estima-
tor. Our inference uses a bootstrap approach taking account of the estimation error
in the propensity score. We perform a sensitivity analysis on the implementation
details of the evaluation approach.
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Our results indicate that modeling transition rates is more appropriate than using
unconditional employment rates. Using only employment rates as success criterion
could result in misleading conclusions concerning the effectiveness of ALMP pro-
grams. With regard to the transition rates, we find that the employment effects are
mostly insignificant and that there are some significantly positive effects for selected
start dates.
In addition, our results show the usefulness of exploiting the additional information
which transition rates can provide as opposed to unconditional employment rates.
With the aid of transition rates we are able to determine whether ALMP programs
help to find a job and/or whether they rather stabilize employment. Our results
show significant variation over time concerning these two outcomes.
We make three additional points in the methodological debate on program evalua-
tion: First, anticipation effects regarding future participation or eligibility criteria
(Ashenfelter’s Dip) requiring a certain elapsed duration of unemployment for par-
ticipation are likely to affect strongly the results of any difference–in–differences
estimator (Heckman and Smith, 1999). Using institutional knowledge to bound
the start of the Ashenfelter’s Dip, we suggest a long–run difference–in–differences
estimator to take account of possible effects of anticipation or participation rules.
Second, we suggest a heuristic cross–validation procedure for the bandwidth choice
which is well suited to the estimation of conditional expectations for counterfactual
variables.
The third point relates to the fact that in East Germany individuals often participate
more than once in a program during a short time period. Some observers (e.g. Hagen
and Steiner, 2000) suggest that multiple program participation occurs because the
participants cannot (or do not want to) find a job after the end of the first program.
In order to keep their transfer income (and possibly in order to lower the level of
official unemployment), these persons participate in a further program “carousel
effect”). To address this issue, our study estimates the effects of participation in
training as first program and of participation in a second program afterwards, be it
a second training program or a job creation program. Regarding participation in a
second program, we estimate both the incremental effect of the second program and
the combined effect using our difference–in–differences approach.1
Former studies on the effect of ALMP in East Germany on the individual employ-
ment chances provide mainly negative though unclear evidence, see the surveys in
Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2002) and Hagen and Steiner (2000). The existing
studies suffer greatly from data limitations, either they are plagued by a small num-
1Some progress has been made in the methodological literature in order to extend standard
static evaluation approaches to the dynamic selection issue involved here, see Lechner/Miquel
(2001). The requirements on the data when applying the Lechner/Miquel approach are unlikely
to be satisfied in our case (see section 3 below) and we are not aware of an actual application of
this approach.
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ber of participants (German Socio-Economic Panel, e.g. Lechner, 1998) or the data
is limited to the early 1990’s and does not allow for constructing the employment
history on a monthly basis (Labor Market Monitor for East Germany, e.g. Fitzen-
berger/Prey, 2000).2
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short description of the institu-
tional background for ALMP in East Germany and discusses descriptive evidence.
Section 3 develops the microeconomic evaluation approach used here. The imple-
mentation of the approach is described and the empirical results of the evaluation
are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes. The appendix includes detailed
descriptive evidence and results.
2 Training in East Germany
2.1 Background
Between 1969 and 1997, training as part of Active Labor Market Policy in Germany
was regulated by the Labor Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG). Despite
a number of changes in the regulation over this time period, the basic design of train-
ing programs remained almost unchanged until the AFG was replaced by the new
Social Law Book III (SGB III) in 1998. The German Federal Labor Office (Bunde-
sanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, BA) was in charge of implementing these programs in addition
to being responsible for job placement and for paying out unemployed benefits.
Training programs under the AFG rule fell into four categories:3 Further Vocational
Training (Fortbildung), Re–training (Umschulung), Short–term training (Kurzzeit-
maßnahmen nach § 41a AFG) and Integration subsidies (Einarbeitungszuschuss,
§§ 33 – 52 AFG). With German unification, these programs were extended to East
Germany after July 1990 (§ 249 AFG). Policy makers intended to foster the adjust-
ment of the East German human capital stock to Western levels. The large and
prolonged use of ALMP was also justified by equity goals (the standard of living
in East Germany should converge quickly to Western levels) and by political goals
(political stability after a massive transformation shock and avoiding large scale
outmigration).
2Our earlier paper Bergemann et al. (2000), where the impact on employment rates is estimated
for the period 1990 to 1998, is an exception. Reliable administrative data on ALMP has so far not
been made available.
3We ignore German language courses which have different target groups.
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2.2 Training under the Labor Promotion Act 1990–1997
Further vocational training (§ 41 AFG) consists of the assessment, maintenance, and
extension of skills. The duration of the courses depends on the characteristics of the
participants. The courses regularly take between 2 and 8 months and are mainly
offered by private sector training companies.
Re–training enables vocational re–orientation if no adequate employment can be
found because of skill obsolescence. Re–training is supported by the BA for a period
up to 2 years and aims at providing a new certified vocational training degree.
Short–term training aim at increasing the employment chances by skill assessment,
orientation, and guidance. The courses are intended to increase the placement rate
of the unemployed. Mostly, they do not provide occupational skills but aim at
maintaining search intensity and increasing hiring chances. The courses usually last
from two weeks to two months.
Integration Subsidies involve payments to employers providing employment to pre-
viously unemployed workers who need a training period. The worker earns a regular
wage from the employer. This program is included in official numbers of partici-
pation in training programs. However, it is not analyzed in our empirical analysis
because the data used do not allow to identify it.
Except for integration subsidies, all participants in full–time courses are granted
an income maintenance payment (Unterhaltsgeld) if the conditions of entitlement
are satisfied. To qualify, persons must meet the requirement of being previously
employed for a minimum duration during a set period of time, i.e. at least one year
in employment or receipt of unemployment benefit or subsequent unemployment
assistance. The set period may be extended for individuals returning to the labor
market.
The income maintenance payment amounts to the same level as unemployment
benefits, i.e. to 67% (60%) of previous net earnings for participants with (without)
at least one dependent child. The income maintenance payments used to be higher
in the early 1990’s (see below). If a person does not fulfill the requirement of previous
employment, but received unemployment assistance until the start of treatment, the
income maintenance may be paid as well. Participants re–qualify for unemployment
benefits providing an additional incentive for participation. The BA also covers all
the direct training costs such as course fees.
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2.3 Changes in Programs and Incentives
During the 1990’s, legislation modified the types of programs, the level of income
maintenance payments, and the eligibility criteria. Short–term training programs
were abolished formally in 1992 and in 1993, a new program started with the same
purpose. However, participants were no longer considered as taking part in training
programs and were therefore recorded as unemployed. Income maintenance pay-
ments were reduced after 1993 from 68% (63%) of the net earnings during previous
employment for participants with (without) children to 63% (60%).
Before 1994, participation in a training program was accessible for participants
without having experienced unemployment beforehand as long as the case worker
considered participation in training as “advisable”. This type of training intended
to prevent future unemployment, to increase the labor market prospects of the
employed in the future, or to foster re–integration of individuals returning to the
labor market. Starting in 1994, the access was restricted to individuals fulfilling the
criteria for “necessary” training which basically restricted the program to formerly
unemployed participants. However, especially in East Germany, the participation
under the weak criterion of “being threatened by unemployment” was still possible.
The changes resulted in a new mix of participants in trainings programs and they
somewhat shifted the focus of training. A credible evaluation strategy has to account
for these changes.
The end of explicit short–term training programs made the remaining programs
longer and more expensive on average. In addition, the remaining program mix
was less explicitly focussed on a immediate placement of participants. The mix of
programs observed after the change is more strongly focussed on providing additional
skills and helping participants to signal their skills. We suspect therefore that, on
the one hand, incentives to participate are stronger on average than for the program
mix before the reform. This may result on average in stronger anticipation effects
such that in the prospect of participation unemployed individuals decrease their
search effort for a new job.
On the other hand, training programs became less attractive, especially for workers
who are still employed, both due to the lower income maintenance payments and
due to the focus on previously unemployed individuals. Over time, a change in the
selection of the program group occurred restricting training to problem groups with
a priori significantly lower employment chances.
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2.4 Aggregate Participation
Training programs were implemented in East Germany immediately after unification
(see figure 1): 98,500 persons started to participate during the last three months
of 1990. In 1991, the maximum was reached with 892,145 entries. Only in 1992,
there was a similar magnitude. Afterwards the number was much lower and it went
down to 166,000 in 1997. During the most recent years, participation recovered at a
level slightly above 180,000 reflecting the ongoing importance of these programs in
East Germany. The share of entries into re–training in percent of training in total
varies between 15% in 1991 and 28% in 1993, the share for integration subsidies
declines from 15% in 1991 to 8% in 1997. No separate figures are available neither
for short–term training and further vocational training for the early 1990’s nor for
the subprograms after 1997 due to the change in the regulation.
Stocks of participants show a similar pattern (see figure 2). The maximum was
reached in 1992, amounting to 492,000 participants on average. Participation has
been declining afterwards (2000: 139,700, 2002: 129,000 participants). The trends
for the subprograms (not reported in figure 2) are analogous.
Direct costs for participation paid by the BA (see figure 2, right axis) – income
maintenance, course fees, travel costs etc. – continuously increased over time. In
1991, when short–term training programs still existed, annual costs were at e 8,000
per participant. With e 14,600 in 1995 and the most recent number being e 20,600,
the programs observed became much more expensive over time.
3 Evaluation Approach
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causality
(Roy, 1951, Rubin, 1974), see the survey Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999). We
focus on estimating the average causal effect of treatment–on–the–treated (TT) in
the binary treatment case.4 TT is given by
E(Y 1|D = 1)− E(Y 0|D = 1) ,(1)
4The framework can be extended to allow for multiple, exclusive discrete treatments. Lechner
(1999) and Imbens (2000) show how to extend standard propensity score matching estimators
for this purpose and e.g. Larsson (2003) provides an application to ALMP in Sweden based on a
large and quite homogeneous treatment and comparison group. Although, it would be a natural
extension in our application to explicitly allow for multiple, exclusive treatments by ALMP, we do
not think that our data is sufficiently rich enough for this purpose. In addition, our analysis is
much more demanding since we argue that matching on observable covariates will not suffice to
control for selection bias and since we model the effects on transition rates between different labor
market states. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to estimating TT for training where the comparison
group is the group of all individuals who either do not participate in any program or who only
participate in other programs where the latter two are weighted by their sample frequencies.
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where the treatment outcome Y 1 and the nontreatment outcome Y 0 are the two
potential outcomes and D denotes the treatment dummy. Our outcome variable of
interest is a dummy variable for employment, possibly conditional on employment
in the previous month resulting in a transition dummy. The observed outcome Y
is given by Y = DY 1 + (1 −D)Y 0. The evaluation problem consists of estimating
E(Y 0|D = 1) since the counterfactual outcome in the nonparticipation situation is
not observed for the participating individuals (D = 1). Thus, identifying assump-
tions are needed to estimate E(Y 0|D = 1) based on the outcomes for nonparticipants
(D = 0).
We apply a conditional difference–in–differences (CDiD) approach which combines
two widely used concepts to estimate the average nontreatment outcome for the
treated E(Y 0|D = 1). One is to consider the situation of program participants
before treatment (before–after–comparison) and the other is to consider a con-
trol group of comparable persons who did not participate. The major drawback
of the before–and–after comparison lies in the assumption of a constant average
nontreatment outcome over time for the treated population. This is violated, if
over time labor market outcomes change irrespective of participation, i.e. formally
E(Y 0t0|D = 1) 6= E(Y 0t1|D = 1) where t0 is a point of time before treatment and
t1 after treatment. Another issue involves participation rules and possible antic-
ipation effects of the treatment (Ashenfelter’s Dip) resulting in Y 0t0 already being
affected by the treatment in the future. Regarding the selection of an appropriate
control group, it is usually not warranted to assume that the average nonpartici-
pation outcome of the participants is the same as for the nonparticipants, i.e. we
have E(Y 0|D = 1) 6= E(Y 0|D = 0). Thus, a readily available sample estimate for
E(Y 0|D = 0) is not a consistent estimate for the counterfactual E(Y 0|D = 1).
3.1 Selection on Observables and Matching
Assuming the Conditional Mean Independence Assumption (CIA)
E(Y 0|D = 1, X) = E(Y 0|D = 0, X)(2)
implies that the nontreatment outcome of the participants and of the nonparticipants
are now comparable in expectation when conditioning on X. Then, to estimate the
expected nonparticipation outcome for the participants with observable characteris-
tics X, it suffices to take the average outcome for nonparticipants with the same X.
This is the basis of the popular matching approach, see Heckman/Ichimura/Todd
(1998), Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998), Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999),
or Lechner (1998). This approach estimates the expected nontreatment outcome
for a participant i with characteristics X by the fitted value of a nonparametric re-
gression in the sample of nonparticipants at point X. The nonparametric regression
can be represented by a weight function wN0(i, j) that gives the higher a weight to
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nonparticipants j the stronger his similarity to participant i regarding X. For each
i, these weights sum up to one over j (
∑
j∈{D=0}wN0(i, j) = 1). The estimated TT
is then
1
N1
∑
j∈{D=1}
 Y 1i − ∑
j∈{D=0}
wN0(i, j)Y
0
j
 ,(3)
with N0 the number of nonparticipants j and N1 the number of participants i.
Matching estimators differ with respect to the weights attached to members of the
comparison group. The most popular approach in the literature is nearest neighbor
matching just using the outcome for the closest nonparticipant (j(i)) as the com-
parison level for participant i, see Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999) and Lechner
(1998). In this case, wN0(i, j(i)) = 1 for the nearest neighbor j(i) and wN0(i, j) = 0
for all other nonparticipants j 6= j(i). Following Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, Todd
(1998), we implement a different matching approach using a nonparametric local
linear kernel regression to estimate the expected nonparticipation outcome of par-
ticipants with certain characteristics, see also Pagan/Ullah (1999). This amounts to
specifying the weight function based on a kernel function which has as its argument
the distance in terms of characteristics of the individuals.5 This so called kernel
matching has a number of theoretical advantages compared to nearest neighbor
matching. The asymptotic properties of kernel based methods are straightforward
to analyze and it has been shown that bootstrapping provides a consistent estimator
of the sampling variability of the estimator in (3) even if matching is based on close-
ness in generated variables (this is the case with the popular method of propensity
score matching which will be discussed below), see Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd
(1998) or Ichimura/Linton (2001) for an asymptotic analysis of kernel based treat-
ment estimators. We are not aware of similar results for nearest neighbor matching.
It is difficult to match with respect to a high–dimensional vector of observable
characteristics X (“curse–of–dimensionality”), see Pagan/Ullah (1999). Therefore,
the evaluation literature uses extensively the result of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
that the CIA in equation (2) implies that participants and nonparticipants become
comparable in expectation when conditioning on the treatment probability P (X)
(propensity score) as a function of the observable characteristics X, i.e.
E(Y 0|D = 1, P (X)) = E(Y 0|D = 0, P (X))(4)
provided 0 < P (D = 1|X) < 1. This result reduces the matching problem to one
dimension effectively using the “closeness” in the propensity score as the weighting
scheme. However, the propensity score has to be estimated. We implement kernel
matching based on the estimated propensity score. We take account of the sampling
5We also checked the sensitivity of our results by using nearest neighbor matching without and
with caliper (the latter allows only for matches which are sufficiently close). For our application, it
turned out that the choice of matching approach had no notable impact on the estimated treatment
effects. We only report the results using kernel matching.
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variability in the estimated propensity score by applying a computationally quite
expensive bootstrap method to construct the standard errors of the estimated treat-
ment effects. To account for autocorrelation over time, we use the entire time path
for each individual as block resampling unit. All the bootstrap results reported in
this paper are based on 200 resamples.
For the local linear kernel regression in the sample of nonparticipants, we use the
Gaussian kernel, see Pagan/Ullah (1999).6 Standard bandwidth choices (e.g. rules
of thumb) for pointwise estimation are not advisable here since the estimation of the
treatment effect is based on the average expected nonparticipation outcome for the
group of participants, possibly after conditioning on some information to capture the
heterogeneity of treatment effects. Since averaging pointwise estimates reduces the
variance, it is clear that the asymptotically optimal bandwidth should go to zero
faster than an optimal bandwidth for a pointwise estimate, see Ichimura/Linton
(2001) on such results for a different estimator of treatment effects.7
To choose the bandwidth, we suggest the following heuristic leave–one–out cross–
validation procedure which mimics the estimation of the average expected nonpar-
ticipation outcome for each period. First, for each participant i, we identify the
nearest neighbor nn(i) in the sample of nonparticipants, i.e. the nonparticipant
whose propensity score is closest to that of i. Second, we choose the bandwidth to
minimize the sum of the period–wise squared prediction errors
T∑
t=1
 1
N1,t
N1,t∑
i=1
Y 0nn(i),t − ∑
j∈{D=0}\nn(i)
wi,jY
0
j,t
2
where the prediction of employment status for nn(i) is not based on the nearest
neighbor nn(i) himself and t = 1, ..., T denotes the month (T = 120 for our data).
The optimal bandwidth affecting the weights wi,j through the local linear regression
is determined by a one–dimensional search. The resulting bandwidth is typically
smaller than a rule–of–thumb value for pointwise estimation, but this is not always
the case, see Ichimura/Linton (2001) for similar evidence in small samples based
on simulated data. Since our method for the bandwidth choice is computationally
quite expensive, it is not possible to bootstrap it. Instead, we use the bandwidth
found for the sample in all resamples.
6A kernel function with unbounded support avoids some of the problems involved with local
linear kernel regression, namely, that the variance can be extremely high in areas where there is
not a lot of data, see Seifert/Gasser (1996) and Fro¨lich (2001) for a critical assessment of local
linear kernel regression.
7This is also the rationale for researchers using nearest neighbor matching with just the closest
neighbor thus focussing on minimizing the bias.
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3.2 Employment Model and Ashenfelter’s Dip
We specify the econometric model for employment in order to be clear about which
treatment parameters are estimated. The dummy variable for employment Yit of
individual i in month t exhibits strong state dependence, i.e. holding everything else
constant the probability to remain employed P (Yit = 1 | Yi,t−1 = 1) given that i is
employed in the previous month is likely to be much higher than the reemployment
probability P (Yit = 1 | Yi,t−1 = 0) given that i is not employed in the previous
month.8 Therefore, the dynamic employment process for individual i is specified
using separate outcome equations depending on the state in the previous month as
Yit =
 a
e(Xi, t) + δ
e
i,t,τDi,t(τ) + c
e
i + u
e
i,t for Yi,t−1 = 1 (employed before)
an(Xi, t) + δ
n
i,t,τDi,t(τ) + c
n
i + u
n
i,t Yi,t−1 = 0 (not empl. before)
(5)
where Di,t(τ) is a dummy variable for treatment in period τ , a
e(Xi, t), a
n(Xi, t)
are functions describing the state dependent employment probabilities as a flexible
function of observed time invariant characteristics Xi and month t, δ
e
i,t,τ , δ
n
i,t,τ are
the individual specific, state dependent effects of treatment on the employment
probabilities, cei , c
n
i are state dependent permanent individual specific effects, and
uei,t, u
n
i,t are the idiosyncratic, period specific effects. To simplify the notation, we
only consider the effects of treatment in one period τ . Furthermore, we assume
that the effect of treatment occurs after treatment, i.e. δki,t,τ = 0 for t < τ and
k = e, n.9 We will discuss below Ashenfelter’s Dip as linking treatment and the
idiosyncratic error term before treatment. We allow the individual treatment effect
δki,t,τ (k = e, n) to depend upon observed characteristicsXi and the individual specific
effects cki . They are also allowed to vary by i, t, and τ conditional upon Xi and c
k
i .
For the idiosyncratic error terms, we assume that uei,t, u
n
i,t are mean independent of
treatment in the past.
Regarding the issue of selection bias, the evaluation approach should allow that
treatment Di,t(τ) is affected by the observed covariates (Xi, t), by the treat-
ment effects δei,t,τ , δ
n
i,t,τ and by the individual specific effects c
e
i , c
n
i . Furthermore,
we should not impose strong functional form restrictions on the specification of
ae(Xi, t), a
n(Xi, t). The evaluation approach should be as nonparametric as possible
relying on the smallest plausible set of assumptions.
It is often observed, that shortly before the participation in a labor market pro-
gram the employment situation of the future participants deteriorates dispropor-
tionately. A similar finding termed Ashenfelter’s Dip was first discovered when
evaluating the treatment effects on earnings (Ashenfelter, 1978). Later research
8In this section, the index i denotes any individual whereas in the remainder of the paper i
applies only to treated individuals.
9This assumption is similar to the timing–of–events approach in the literature using duration
models to estimate treatment effects, see Abbring/Van den Berg (2003).
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demonstrated that the same phenomenon can also occur regarding employment, see
Heckman/LaLonde/Smith (1999), Heckman/Smith (1999), and Fitzenberger/Prey
(2000). We argue that in our context Ashenfelter’s Dip is caused by participation
rules or anticipation effects. Therefore, we allow that Di,t(τ) can be correlated with
uki,τ−s (k = e, n) with s = 1, . . . , ad and ad denotes the begin of Ashenfelter’s Dip.
Even though no tough participation rules were applied in East Germany in the early
1990’s, it is clear that in most cases unemployment must have lasted some time be-
fore treatment could start. A reason for anticipation effects can be that unemployed
workers or workers at the risk of becoming unemployed reduce their search effort if
they know that participation in an active labor market program is an option in the
near future. Analogously, unemployed individuals expecting to start a new job in
the future are not likely to receive treatment.
It is conceivable to interpret Ashenfelter’s Dip as a treatment effect thus violating our
timing–of–events assumption. We stick to this assumption since both anticipation
effects and participation rules have no bearing on the economic mechanisms at work
during and after treatment. Therefore, we assume that these preprogram effects are
not linked to the outcome variable once treatment has started, i.e. uki,τ−s (k = e, n)
are not correlated with uki,t with s ≥ 1 and t ≥ τ .10
In our empirical analysis, we allow for a maximum length of time (ad months) for
Ashenfelter’s Dip. ad is set according to institutional features of the programs under
consideration. After inspection of the data, we set ad conservatively and we let it
vary over time (see section 4.3 and 4.4). While it is likely that shortly after German
unification the anticipation of program participation occurs only shortly before the
begin of the program and participation rules were applied in a very lax way, ad
increases with the rise of unemployment during the early 1990s.
3.3 Conditional Difference–in–Differences
While the matching approach addresses selection bias due to observed variables,
selection bias due to unobserved characteristics has to be addressed differently. We
allow the selection into treatment to be affected by the permanent unobserved effects
in our employment model in equation (5). For instance, unobserved characteristics
could be due to differences in the motivation of participants or could reflect that
programs are targeted to individuals with some particular problems in the labor
market.11 The difference–in–differences estimator can be used when selection effects
10This is in contrast to Heckman/Smith (1999) who model the recovery process to be expected
(based on nontreatment outcomes) after the treatment being parallel to the deterioration during
Ashenfelter’s Dip. The state dependence in our employment process results in a recovery process
which does not have to be parallel to what happens before the treatment.
11We do not pursue to estimate an econometric selection model since the scarce data do not
allow for credible exclusion restrictions in the participation equation, see section 4.1.
11
are additively separable and time invariant. Then, it is possible to use the frame-
work in section 3.1 by merely analyzing the before–after–change in the outcome
variable instead of its level. We implement a conditional difference–in–differences
(CDiD) estimator using preprogram differences in the outcome variable after match-
ing to control for remaining unobservable differences. In order to avoid the “fallacy
of alignment” (Heckman/LaLonde/Smith, 1999), we have to take account of possi-
ble preprogram effects via Ashenfelter’s Dip. We extend the CDiD as used in the
literature to fully capture the state dependence in the employment process.
3.3.1 Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Employment Rate
Following the approach in Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998),12 we use kernel
matching based on the estimated propensity score to match participants i and non-
participants j in the same time period t and then the simple CDiD–estimator for
the treatment effect on the employment rate13 in period t1 is given by
1
N1
N1∑
i=1
Y 1i,t1 − Y 0i,t0 −∑
j
wi,j(Y
0
j,t1 − Y 0j,t0)

where period t1 lies after and t0 before treatment of individual i, N1 is the number
of participants i for whom the t1 − t0 difference can be determined, and due to
Ashenfelter’s Dip t0 must lie before τ − ad.14
CDiD is a valid estimator if the employment process in equation (5) does not exhibit
state dependence and if the idiosyncratic error term is conditionally mean indepen-
dent of treatment status D and covariates Xi, i.e. E(ui,t|D = 1, Xi) = E(ui,t|D =
0, Xi) = 0 for t ≥ τ and t < τ − ad, ae(Xi, t) = an(Xi, t), ci = cei = cni , and
ui,t = u
e
i,t = u
n
i,t. However, the common individual specific effect ci does not have to
be conditionally mean independent D and Xi.
3.3.2 Conditional Difference–in–Differences in Hazard Rates (CDiDHR)
Based on the employment model in equation (5), we develop the following Condi-
tional Difference–in–Differences in Hazard Rates (CDiDHR) estimator as an exten-
sion of the CDiD estimator to a state dependent employment process. We simply
12See also Blundell et al. (2003) for an application of the CDiD, where age and regional variation
is used to take account of selection effects.
13Although our model is defined in discrete time we use the word ‘rate’, as it can be aggregated
to a probability in discrete time.
14We do not take symmetric differences (τ0 − t0 = t1− τ1 with τ0 begin of program and τ1 end
of program) as in Heckman/Ichimura/Smith/Todd (1998) or Heckman/Smith (1999). We think
their approach assumes an implausible symmetry between those effects driving Ashenfelter’s Dip
and the recovery process after participation, see also discussion in footnote 10 above.
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estimate the treatment effect on the probability to be employed via CDiD condi-
tional on employment status in the previous month by
1
N l
∑
i∈N l
gi
Y 1i,t1 − Y 0i,t0 −∑
j
wi,j(Y
0
j,t1 − Y 0j,t0)
(6)
where l denotes the employment status in the previous month (l = 1 if previously
employed and l = 0 if previously nonemployed), N l is the set of treated individuals
for whom Yi,t1−1 = Yi,t0−1 = l, where t1 after and t0 before treatment of individual
i. N l is the number of individuals in N l. Also, only nonparticipants j for whom
Yj,t1−1 = Yj,t0−1 = l. gi is a set of weights to account for the fact that N l does not
include the entire treatment sample. For l = 0 and l = 1, expression (6) estimates
the reemployment probabilities when unemployed and the probability to remain
employed, respectively.
To properly account for selection bias in the nonparticipation outcome, CDiDHR
only requires the idiosyncratic error terms to be conditionally mean independent of
treatment status D and covariates Xi, i.e. E(u
e
i,t|D = 1, Xi) = E(uei,t|D = 0, Xi) =
E(uni,t|D = 1, Xi) = E(uni,t|D = 0, Xi) = 0 for t ≥ τ and t < τ − ad. Analogous
to CDiD, the individual specific effects cli do not have to be conditionally mean
independent of treatment status D and covariates Xi. Also for CDiDHR, t0 must
lie before−ad, i.e. before anticipation and participation rules can take effect, because
of the possibility of Ashenfelter’s Dip.
A disadvantage at first glance lies in the fact that using weights gi = 1, CDiDHR
does not identify the unconditional TT E(δki,t1,τ |D = 1) but instead the TT
E(δki,t1,τ |D = 1, Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l) conditional on the employment status l both in
the previous month (l = 0 if k = n and l = 1 if k = e) and in the month before
the baseline period t0. The latter TT is not the same as the unconditional TT with
the potential treatment effects δki,t,τ being defined irrespective of the employment
status of individual i in the previous month. To estimate the unconditional TT,
it would be necessary both to account for the differences in the distribution of the
Xi characteristics and of the individual specific effects c
k
i with k = e, n, since the
individual specific treatment effects in the employment model (5) as well as the ob-
served employment status in the previous month presumably depend upon both Xi
and the cki ’s. Differences in Xi and the c
k
i ’s result in a sorting of high employment
individuals into the group of employed individuals in the previous month and vice
versa.
In section 4, we define the weights gi to integrate out the distribution of Xi in the
treatment sample by using a regression model where the mean effect is evaluated at
the average of the Xi in the treatment sample. Effectively, we then identify the TT
EXi,D=1{E(δki,t1,τ |D = 1, Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l, Xi)|D = 1, Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l}
conditional on the employment status l in the previous month and in the month
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before the baseline period t0 where the outer expectation EXi,D=1 integrates out
with respect to the distribution of Xi in the sample D = 1. Thus, conditioning
on (Yt1−1 = l, Yt0−1 = l) only affects the distribution of the individual specific
effects and the latter is partly controlled for through the correlation between Xi and
the cki ’s. Regarding the information in the c
k
i ’s not controlled for, our treatment
effect weights the individual treatment effects by the frequencies that individuals
are employed and not employed in the previous period before and after treatment,
respectively.
Our approach estimates the unconditional TT under the following two stringent
conditions: First, the treatment effects are conditionally mean independent of the
individual specific effects when also conditioning on Xi, i.e. E(δ
k
i,t1,τ |cei , cni , Xi) =
E(δki,t1,τ |Xi). Second, we do observe each treated individual in both employment
states before anticipation and participation rules take effect so that the before–
after–difference can be calculated for some t0 in the past. The second assumption
is quite innocuous in our application since we consider the preprogram situation up
to 18 months in the past. The preprogram level is then the average transition rate
conditional on the employment state in the previous month. For almost all treated
individuals, these averages are available for both states. The first condition does
not hold when the selection into treatment depends upon the treatment effects δki,t1,τ
conditional upon Xi via the individual specific effects. We do not think that the
latter condition is likely to hold.
There is no ready procedure to estimate the unconditional TT by also integrating
out the individual specific effects without imposing further stringent assumptions.
Thus, we only integrate out the Xi distribution in the treatment sample. It is quite
plausible that, conditional on Xi, both treatment effects δ
k
i,t1,τ are positively corre-
lated with the individual specific effects and that the two individual specific effects
are positively correlated. Then, our approach will overestimate the TT for the prob-
abilities to remain employed and it will underestimate the TT for the reemployment
probabilities. Given this, we will nevertheless be able to draw conclusions on the
effectiveness of training programs based on the estimation results.
3.4 Multiple Treatments and Carousel Effects
To take into account multiple sequential treatments such that an individual partici-
pates in labor market programs more than once, we extend our evaluation approach
to the analysis of a first and second treatment. We specify the TT of participation
in a second program compared to the situation of not having participated in this
specific treatment sequence. The treatment dummy D is defined such that D = 1
indicates treatment in this specific treatment sequence and D = 0 indicates all three
other alternatives, i.e. (i) no program participation, (ii) a first training program and
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no further treatment or another second program not considered here, or (iii) a first
treatment other than training.
The estimation of the combined effect of the sequence of the first and second treat-
ment is a straight forward application of the single binary treatment case. Indi-
viduals with at most one training program participation D = 0 are matched to
individuals who participate in a second program D = 1. For CDiD(HR), we use the
differences between the period after the second treatment and the period before the
first treatment.
To evaluate the incremental effect of the second program we suggest the follow-
ing heuristic two step procedure. Based on the timing of events, the incremental
treatment effect is estimated by CDiD(HR) using the outcome before and after the
second treatment in the matched sample. Treating previous program participation
as nonemployment, the average incremental effect of the second program is obtained.
The matching procedure uses all nonparticipants of the second program, i.e. the es-
timated effect relates to the composition of this group. To properly account for
selection into the second treatment, we assume that the impact of the individual
specific effects enters the individual treatment effects δki,t,τ for the first program as
an additive constant. Unfortunately, our approach does not allow for the selection
into the second program to depend directly upon the individual treatment effect of
the first program.
Evaluating the combined and incremental effects of multiple program participation,
it is possible to investigate whether multiple treatments occur for individuals with
particularly bad labor market prospects, whether a further treatment improves the
outcome, or whether it just occurs because the participants are unlikely to find a job
after the first treatment and this is still the case after further program participation
(“carousel effect”). In our approach, a pairwise (“data hungry”) evaluation (see
Lechner (1999) and footnote 4 above for the evaluation of heterogeneous treatments)
can be avoided.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data
Our analysis uses the Labor Market Monitor Sachsen–Anhalt15 (Arbeitsmarktmoni-
tor Sachsen–Anhalt, LMM–SA) for the years 1997, 1998, and 1999. The LMM–SA is
a panel survey of the working–age population of the state (Bundesland) of Sachsen–
15Although the data refer to the state of Sachsen–Anhalt only, the results are likely to be
representative for East Germany as a whole (see Schulz, 1998). For further information on the
data set, see Ketzmerik (2001).
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Anhalt with 7,100 participants in 1997, 5,800 in 1998, and 4,760 in 1999. 1999 is the
last year in which the survey was conducted. Only in the three years used, retro-
spective questionnaires on the monthly employment status between 1990 and up to
December 1999 were included. The monthly data provide all possible labor market
states, i.e. employment, unemployment, or participated in a program of ALMP, as
well as periods in the education system, inactivity, or in military. Individuals who
did not participate in the 1998 survey are recorded until at least September 1997,
those who dropped out in 1999 at least until October 1998.
Selection of Sample
Unfortunately, in the three survey years used the categories of the labor market
states differ. For compatibility, the data set also includes a combined monthly
calendar for the three survey years (compiled by the ZSH institute). This
calendar distinguishes the following categories: Education, full–time employed,
part–time employed, unemployed, job–creation scheme, training, retirement, preg-
nancy/maternity leave, not in active workforce.
We only consider individuals with complete information on their labor market his-
tory between January 1990 and at least until September 1997 (i.e. individuals who
completed the retrospective question in 1997). The individuals are between 25 and
50 years old in January 1990 and employed before the start of the “Economic and
Social Union” in June 1990. This way, only individuals are included who had be-
longed to the active labor force of the former GDR, who therefore were fully hit by
the transformation shock, and who are not too close to retirement.16 Individuals,
who are later on in education or on maternity leave are excluded completely from
the analysis. The goal is to construct a consistent data base excluding individuals
who have left the labor market completely. In addition, individuals without valid
information on those individual characteristics, on which we build the matching, are
excluded. We aggregate the remaining labor market states to the four categories em-
ployment, which comprises part– and full–time employment, nonemployment, which
comprises unemployment and out of labor force, training and job creation.
Our outcome variable employment is defined with nonemployment as alternative
resulting in a binary outcome variable. Modeling transitions between unemployment
and being out of labor force is here an impossible task. People move occasionally
back and forth between the two states in the data and it is not obvious whether
the individuals precisely distinguish between unemployment and being out of labor
force, since no formal definition of unemployment is given in the questionnaire.
The resulting sample consists of 5,165 individuals and it is likely to be quite repre-
sentative for the labor force in the former GDR. Table 1 summarizes participation
16Massive early retirement programs were implemented in the early 1990s in order to reduce the
labor force.
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in ALMP based on our data. The two programs considered, Training (TR) and
Job Creation Schemes (JC), were implemented at a large scale. In total, 27% of
our sample participated at least once in one of the two programs. While 13% (689
cases) participated at least once in JC, TR was the most important program with
a rate of 20% (1,021 cases).17 Our data do not distinguish between further training
and retraining. Therefore, the estimated treatment effects are an average of the two
programs.
After a first training program, a second treatment in training or JC occurred in 326
cases, i.e. more than 36% of the 889 cases in a first treatment in TR participated in
another program at least a second time. Because of the importance of the timing of
events, we differentiate between the effects of a first and a second treatment. This
paper focuses on the effects of TR, thus restricting ourselves to TR being the first
treatment. Using the evaluation approach described in section 3, we estimate first
the effects of FTR (participation in training as the first program) (889 cases) and
then the effect of the second treatment for the two sequences TR–TR (150 cases)
and TR–JC (176 cases). No further treatment afterwards is analyzed, since the
number of cases is very small.
Recall Errors
Retrospective data, which in our case covers at least 8 years, entails the danger of
recall errors. In the following, we will argue that recall errors are less problematic
in our analysis than it is typically the case with retrospective data.
First of all, note that the individuals were asked about their employment history
starting with the year 1990. This year constitutes a turning point in the biography
of East Germans, as the political and economic system changed dramatically. The
connection of biographic events with historic events, as done here, typically improves
the validity of recall data (Loftus/Marburger, 1983, Robinson, 1986). Additionally,
starting with the salient year 1990 the individuals had to answer in chronological
order, which is now commonly viewed as the best technique in collecting life history
data in a single survey (Sudman/Bradburn, 1987). Second, our broad definition of
employment states circumvents some of the recall errors which are present when
analyzing more than two labor market states. It helps especially to merge the
states unemployment and out of the labor force. For instance, after some time
in unemployment, women tend to label this as having been out of the labor force
(Dex/McCulloch, 1998). Third, our evaluation design (CDiDHR estimator) allows
for recall errors occurring in the same fashion among treatment and matched control
group. In particular, if both groups forget to mention transitions in a similar way
then the errors simply cancel out.
17The question in the LMM–SA on training does also include privately financed training. How-
ever, calculations based on the German Socioeconomic Panel for East Germany show that a very
high share of training is in fact public sector sponsored training (in 1993 more than 88%).
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Thus, recall errors in our analysis might only increase the standard errors of our
estimates. However, if we were estimating individual labor market flows, recall
errors would be more worrying (Paull, 2002) and it might be useful to change the
methodological approach (e.g. following Magnac/Visser, 1999).
4.2 Implementation of Evaluation Approach
We estimate the following five treatment effects: (1) FTR: participation in training
as the first program, (2) TR–TR: incremental effect, (3) TR–TR: combined effect,
(4) TR–JC: incremental effect, and (5) TR–JC: combined effect. For FTR, TR–TR,
and TR–JC,18 the treatment probability (propensity score) is estimated by separate
parametric probit models. Since the data do not provide time–varying information
(except for the labor market status), the regressors are the static observable charac-
teristics education, occupational degree, gender, age, residence (at the time of the
survey) and interactions of gender and education or occupational degree (results can
be found in table 2). The probit model does not model when the participation in
the program actually takes place. We do not think that the data is sufficiently rich
to model the timing. Using a bootstrap estimator for the covariance matrix of the
estimated treatment effects, we capture the estimation error in the propensity score.
For matching based on the propensity score, the group of “nonparticipants” {D = 0}
represents the entire sample of individuals who are not participating in the treatment
sequence under consideration but who might be a participant in another program.
We do not match on the employment history shortly before the program (see Lech-
ner, 1998, for such an approach) due to the possibility of Ashenfelter’s Dip. Our
CDiD(HR) estimators control for remaining long–run preprogram differences after
matching upon the propensity score.
The results of the probit estimates for the propensity score are reported in table 2.
Figures 3 – 6 show the high degree of overlap in the distributions of the estimated
propensity score19 between participants (Treated) and nonparticipants (Nontreated)
for the treatments FTR and TR–TR (the graphs are similar in nature for TR–JC).
The graphs are stratified conditional upon nonemployment and employment in the
previous month, respectively. Since the employment status changes over time and
since after 1997 no complete data is available for all individuals, the overlap can
change over time. Here, the graphs show the overlap of the distributions for the
two months 5/1993 and 5/1997, being representative for other periods. Only in rare
cases, such as FTR in 5/1993 and being previously nonemployed, we find a slightly
less than perfect overlap. Based on this evidence, there is no serious problem of lack
18Recall from the previous subsection that the evaluation of combined and incremental treat-
ments only differ regarding the choice of the preprogram period for the CDiD(HR) estimators.
19The graphs depict the fitted values of the latent index for the probit model. The estimated
treatment probability is the cdf of the standard normal applied to this index.
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of common support for matching and we match the entire treatment sample.
So far, we have not been explicit about the post program evaluation period. We
use two different starting points in time, which are widely used in the literature:
The evaluation of treatment effects starts either after the end of the program or
with the beginning of the program. The former approach excludes the treatment
period from the employment history when evaluating the success of the respective
treatment because treatment is viewed as time spent outside of the labor market.
This exclusion is somewhat unsatisfactory since labor market history continues,
especially so for the nonparticipants. In contrast, the second approach views the
treatment just as a different nonemployment state while searching for a job.
The start of the evaluation period depends also upon the outcome variables consid-
ered. For employment rates and reemployment probabilities, the evaluation period
starts one month after the last or the first month of the treatment depending on
whether evaluation starts after or at the beginning of the treatment. For proba-
bilities to remain employed, the evaluation period starts one month later than for
the other two outcome variables, since we first have to observe employed former
participants. We choose the length of the evaluation period to be 36 months (as far
as being observed in the data set – otherwise set to missing). As preprogram pe-
riod, we take 18 months before the beginning of the treatment. For the incremental
effect of TR–TR and TR–JC, the preprogram period is taken before the beginning
of the second treatment and for the combined effect before the beginning of the first
treatment.
Based on the estimated propensity scores, we construct matched samples of par-
ticipants and comparable “nonparticipants” (matched nonparticipants) both during
the preprogram and the evaluation period. Alignment occurs in the same calendar
month. The characteristics and outcomes of matched nonparticipants are the fitted
values obtained by the local linear kernel regression of characteristics and outcomes,
respectively, on the estimated propensity score in the sample of nonparticipants as a
whole. Table 3 and 4 give evidence on the balancing properties in the matched sam-
ples for the two cases FTR and TR–TR (combined effect). The first column shows
the average characteristics in the whole sample. The remaining columns show the
average characteristics conditional upon employment state in the previous month.
For example, when calculating the average characteristics for the previously nonem-
ployed, the individual contribution to the mean characteristics is weighted by the
number of months the individual’s state was nonemployment during the time period
under consideration. For the matched nonparticipants, the average reported uses all
available observations.
Table 3 and 4 show that participants are younger than the nonparticipants and that
women participate at a higher rate in training than men. There is no clear cut differ-
ence in the skill distribution. It is evident, that the matching process balances well
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the characteristics of the participants and the matched nonparticipants conditional
upon employment status in the previous month. For example, 27% of the previously
nonemployed nonparticipants were aged between 25 and 34 in 1990, whereas 40%
of the participants belonged to this age group. In the matched sample, 36% of the
matched nonparticipants belong to this age group. The balancing works especially
well for the previously employed in all cases and for the previously nonemployed in
most cases. However, the labor market region does not seem perfectly balanced for
the latter group.
Furthermore, table 3 and 4 shed some light on the differences in characteristics across
employment states in the previous month. Previously employed participants are
younger than previously nonemployed. Male participants were more often previously
employed compared to females. In the case of FTR, previously employed participants
more often have a university education.
4.3 Specification of Outcome Equation
In the matched samples, the CDiD(HR) estimators are based on a flexible semi-
parametric linear probability model for the employment dummy as outcome vari-
able. The state of nonemployment includes the participation in ALMP programs
such that previous and subsequent participation in a program are both accounted
for as nonemployment. We estimate an average employment effect of a program
relative to all possible nonemployment states for the treated individuals thus esti-
mating TT (with CDiDHR conditioned on the employment status in the previous
month). For CDiDHR, we also control for observed, time–invariant characteristics
Xi in the outcome equation. The Xi variables enter the equation as deviations from
their averages in the treatment sample.
We assume treatment of individual i begins in period τ and we consider the em-
ployment outcome Y before the begin of treatment t0 = −18, . . . ,−ad − 1, as well
as during the time of Ashenfelter’s Dip and the evaluation period of 36 months
t1 = −ad, . . . ,−1, 1, . . . , 36. Now, t0 is defined relative to the start of the treat-
ment, whereas the definition of t1 depends on the evaluation perspective and the
success criterion. When then evaluation starts at the begin of the program then
t1 is measured relative to τ in case the unconditional employment probability or
the reemployment probability are the outcome variables, whereas t1 is measured
relative to τ + 1 in case of the probability to remain employed. However, when the
evaluation starts after the end of the program τ is replaced by the last month of the
program.
We estimate the following three steps both for CDiD (sample of all participants)
and CDiDHR (separately depending on the employment status in the previous
month):
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1. We calculate the average long–run preprogram difference between participant
i (treatment starts in τ) and comparable nonparticipants as
aˆi,τ =
1
18− ad(τ)
−ad(τ)−1∑
t0=−18
(Y 0i,t0 −
∑
j
wi,jY
0
j,t0) .
2. Then, aˆi,τ is subtracted from the difference during Ashenfelter’s Dip and dur-
ing the evaluation period resulting in the following model to estimate the
treatment effects (I(.) denotes the indicator function, νi,t1 the error term)
Y 1i,t1 −
∑
j
wi,jY
0
j,t1 − aˆi,τ =
36∑
s=−ad(τ)
δsI(t1 = s)(7)
+ (γad1 τ + γ
ad
2 τ
2)I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0) + (γpo1 τ + γpo2 τ 2)I(t1 > 0) + νi,t1 .
For CDiDHR, we include deviations of theXi characteristics from their average
in the treatment sample as additional regressors in equation (7).
3. The average long–run preprogram differences aˆi,τ are regressed on a second
order polynomial in the starting month of the treatment. We will report the
predictions from this regression
αˆ(τ) = α0 + α1τ + α2τ
2(8)
to illustrate how the average long–run preprogram differences (≡ residual se-
lection effect due to permanent individual specific effects) between participants
and nonparticipants after matching depend upon the timing of the program.
The following definitions complement the description:
α0, α1, α2 coefficients measuring the long–run preprogram differences
depending upon the month when the program starts τ ,
ad(τ) month before the begin of the program when Ashenfelter’s
Dip starts depending upon τ ,
δs, γ
ad
1 , γ
ad
2 , γ
po
1 , γ
po
2 coefficients modeling the DiD effect relative to the long–run
preprogram differences aˆi,τ , and
wi,j weights implementing local linear kernel regression on the
estimated propensity score.
Estimating equation (7) as a linear regression, the CDiD(HR) estimators are im-
plemented in a semiparametric way by including the employment situation before
treatment in the dummy regression of outcomes and by allowing the effect of the
program to depend both upon the time since treatment (t1 > 0) and upon the be-
gin of the program τ . The long–run preprogram employment differences aˆi,τ prove
critical for the alignment of the CDiD(HR) estimators. Dummy variables for the
effect of Ashenfelter’s Dip are included to capture the decline in the employment
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probability shortly before the program. The specification allows the employment
differences before and after the program to depend in a flexible way upon τ . Also
the length of Ashenfelter’s Dip is allowed to depend upon the time when the program
starts. During the period shortly after unification, it is likely that the dip is fairly
short since program participation could not have been anticipated long before and
participation rules were applied in a very lax way. The situation changes with the
occurrence of high unemployment when people realized that labor market problems
were quite severe and that ALMP at a large scale was likely to be a permanent
feature of the labor market.
To capture Ashenfelter’s Dip, the following heuristic approach is chosen. For the first
program, a visual inspection of the average employment differences between treated
and matched controls before and after the program as a function of the time when
the program starts indicates that the dip occurs during one to two months in 90/91
and increases over time to something of at most six months for TR and to at most
nine months for JC. In order to obtain a lower bound for the employment effect of a
program (the employment of the future participants decreases during the dip), we are
conservative in defining ad(τ). Before November 90, we set ad(τ) = −1. Between
November 1990 and July 1994, ad(τ) increases linearly in absolute value from 2
months to 6 months for TR and 9 months for JC, respectively, where ad(τ) is rounded
to the nearest integer. After July 1994, ad(τ) remains constant. Our approach is
conservative in the sense that taking a shorter period for Ashenfelter’s Dip would
effectively result a higher difference–in–differences estimate of the treatment effect.
For a program, which started in τ , the following expression captures both the es-
timate for the disproportionately decline in employment during Ashenfelter’s Dip
and the estimated TT after the program
DiD(t1, τ) =
{
δt1 + γ
ad
1 τ + γ
ad
2 τ
2 for −ad(τ) ≤ t1 ≤ −1
δt1 + γ
po
1 τ + γ
po
2 τ
2 t1 = 1, ..., 36
.(9)
If we assume for CDiDHR that the linear specification of the outcome equation in
the Xi characteristics holds exactly, then DiD(t1, τ) estimates the TT conditional
on previous employment status while integrating out the distribution of the Xi in
the treatment sample, see also section 3.3.
For the multiple, sequential treatments, DiD(t1, τ) estimates the incremental em-
ployment effect of the second treatment when the begin of the second program is
taken as the begin of the treatment. The combined effect of the program sequence
is obtained taking the begin of the first program. For the incremental effect, the
effect of a first treatment is possibly included in the permanent preprogram effect
for the participants. Since all TT’s are estimated for the specific selection of indi-
viduals participating in a certain treatment, it is clear that the TT for FTR and
the incremental TT do not have to add up to the combined effect of the treatment
sequence.
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4.4 Estimated Treatment Effects
Before turning to the CDiD(HR) estimates for the treatments considered, we dis-
cuss the outcomes in the matched sample for the treatment FTR. Figure 7 reports
the average differences in employment rates for the matched sample with individ-
uals starting treatment in the two–year periods 1990/91, 1991/92, etc. If the CIA
E(Y 0|D = 1, X) = E(Y 0|D = 0, X) did actually hold with respect to the time
invariant characteristics Xi, then the average differences in employment rates for
the matched samples would be a proper estimate of TT. Right after treatment,
the employment rates of the participants are between 40 and 60 percentage points
(ppoints) lower that for comparable nonparticipants. There is a noticeable recovery
for the participants afterwards – basically the time path reflects the changes for
participants since employment rates for nonparticipants are almost constant – but
the difference comes nowhere close to zero except at the end for 1997/98 (the latter
can be dismissed since it is based on a very small number of cases). Even three years
after treatment, employment rates are still between 20 (90/91) and 40 (mid to late
90s) ppoints lower than for comparable nonparticipants. Thus, under the CIA as
stated above one had to conclude that FTR results in a considerable reduction of
employment rates, which is a common result found in the literature when matching
is based on observable characteristics (see the survey in Hagen/Steiner, 2000).
Considering the preprogram effects in figure 7 raises a number of issues, which are
addressed by our CDiD(HR) estimators, and could lead to a different conclusion.
While in 1990/91 there is no preprogram difference 13 to 18 months before the treat-
ment, long–run preprogram differences in the order of 10 to 20 ppoints exist for later
years. We take this as an indication for the importance of remaining unobservable
differences in the matched sample. Thus, our CDiD(HR) estimators take account
of possible individual specific effects. It is also apparent here that a simple CDiD
estimate based on the difference between long–run postprogram and long–run pre-
program outcomes will result in a negative estimate for TT (as we will see in the
following). There is also a strong decline in employment rates shortly before the
program starts and the decline starts earlier in the later years. In 1990/91, the
decline starts within the last six months before the treatment and the average dif-
ferences immediately before the start of the program amount to 33 ppoints, whereas
in 1997/98 the employment rate of the treated declines already 16 months before
the treatment. We take this as an indication for Ashenfelter’s Dip which a credi-
ble difference–in–differences estimator has to take account of. Basing CDiD on the
difference between postprogram outcomes and preprogram outcomes shortly before
the begin of the program would erroneously result in a positive estimate for TT.
Finally, analyzing employment rates entails the danger that one misses the state
dependence in employment. The continuous decline before the program and the
recovery process after the program suggest that employment rates do not adjust
instantaneously. Thus, one should check for state dependence as well.
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In the following we discuss the results obtained by CDiD and CDiDHR for the treat-
ments considered. We mainly rely on graphical illustrations of the DiD estimates
in equation (9) and the average preprogram levels aˆi,τ . To avoid estimates which
are based on the extrapolation of the parametric model in equation (7), our graph-
ical illustrations only report point estimates representing at least 10 observations.
Tables 5–11 report all the estimated coefficients.
4.4.1 CDiD Results
Figure 8 depicts the estimated CDiD employment effects DiD(t1, τ) in equation
(9) for FTR20 during the evaluation period t1 = 1, , . . . , 36 and for the period of
Ashenfelter’s Dip t1 = −ad(τ), . . . ,−1. We only report the results for the evaluation
period starting after the end of the program. The effects for the evaluation period
starting at the begin of the program are also similar in nature. To illustrate the
changes over time, the estimates are shown in four separate graphs for the starting
dates τ being the month of December in the years 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1996.
The thick, changing line in the graphs represents the estimated DiD(t1, τ) for t1 =
−ad(τ), . . . , 36. The dotted lines around represent the 95%–confidence interval. The
constant line with dotted lines around represents the estimated long–run preprogram
differences αˆ(τ) (“alpha”) with associated 95%–confidence interval. The confidence
intervals are based on the bootstrap covariance estimates.21
For all cases, the CDiD employment effects of FTR prove significantly negative dur-
ing the postprogram period, as to be expected from figure 7. However, the negative
employment effect becomes weaker over time. For the treatment starting in 1990,
we estimate an effect -14 ppoints 36 months after the treatment, the correspond-
ing estimate for the year 1996 is -10 ppoints. Our estimates also clearly show that
the employment rates become considerably lower shortly before the program starts
(Ashenfelter’s Dip) and this effect becomes more pronounced over time. There are
also important changes in the long–run preprogram differences over time. For par-
ticipants starting treatment in 1990, αˆ(τ) is not significantly different from zero.
For 1992, we find already significantly reduced long–run preprogram differences (-16
ppoints) and this feature becomes more important over time (1996: -22 ppoints).
This finding corresponds to training programs becoming more focussed on groups
with severe problems of finding regular employment during the course of the 1990s,
see section 2.
20Since we consider the CDiDHR estimates more credible, we do not report here the CDiD
results for the treatments TR–TR and TR–JC to save space. Also for the same reason, we only
report the FTR results for the evaluation period starting after the end of the program.
21When comparing the bootstrap standard errors to conventional heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors, we find that bootstrap standard errors of both DiD(t1, τ) and αˆ(τ) are higher,
the increase being stronger for the latter. This is also the case for the CDiDHR estimates.
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4.4.2 CDiDHR Results
The CDiDHR esimates take the state dependence in the employment process explic-
itly into account. The outcome variable used is either the reemployment probability
of the previously nonemployed or the probability to remain employed for the previ-
ously employed. Figures 9 to 20 display the estimated CDiDHR employment effects
DiD(t1, τ) in equation (9). All graphs for CDiDHR are organized in the same way
as described above for CDiD referring to figure 8.
Beginning with the treatment FTR, figure 9 summarizes the estimated TT on the
reemployment probability. Evaluation starts after the first month of the program.
The first graph of figure 9 shows the employment effects of a FTR treatment which
began in December 1990. We find positive employment effects during the evalua-
tion period, which are, however, rarely significant. For example, one year after the
program started the participants have a 4 ppoints higher reemployment probabil-
ity than in the nonparticipation case. These positive effects of a FTR vanish for
programs starting later. For December 1994 and later, the effect takes sometimes
negative values, which are significant shortly after the program started. This is not
too surprising since one would expect a reduced search effort when the program has
just started. During Ashenfelter’s Dip, we find a slight decline in the reemployment
probability for the group of participants. This decline is not significant in most cases
and it is much less pronounced than for the CDiD employment effects. The long–
run preprogram difference is significantly negative shortly after the reunification (-6
ppoints), it becomes less negative over time, and it is effectively zero for Decem-
ber 1996. This is in contrast to the CDiD results where the long–run preprogram
difference does increase over time.
Letting the evaluation period start after the end of the program, figure 10 naturally
shows more positive effects on the reemployment chances of former participants.
Also for all cases there is a significantly positive spike in the first month after treat-
ment. This spike can not be interpreted as pure employment effect. This is because
it could reflect the endogenous, premature termination of the program due to a job
offer and then the clock starts to run. However, we also observe smaller but signifi-
cantly positive program effects after the first month. For example, 12 months after
the program the reemployment probability increased by approximately 8 ppoints.
For later starting dates, the positive effects are reduced and more often insignificant.
FTR can have different effects on the probability to remain employed. Figure 11
provides results when the evaluation period starts two months after the begin of
the program. The estimated effect is close to zero for programs which start in
December 1990. However, for later starting dates, the effect becomes significantly
positive. For example, one year after the program started in December 1996 the
probability to remain employed increases by approximately 6 ppoints. Ashenfelter’s
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Dip is very pronounced here with strong significantly negative effects. Anticipation
but also participation rules might play a role here. Shortly after the unification,
the long–run preprogram difference is slightly negative and significant. It becomes
more negative in later periods (-5 ppoints for programs which started in December
1996). In contrast to the results for the reemployment probability, the preprogram
effects for the probability to remain employed are very similar in nature to the CDiD
results above. Changing the evaluation period to start two months after the begin
of the program, the results for the probability to remain employed do not change
qualitatively (see figure 12).
Naturally the question arises, why the results differ for the two outcome variables,
reemployment probability and probability to remain employed. We think that the
results are driven mainly by changes in the content of the training programs over
time. Shortly after unification a large part of training consisted in short courses
mainly aiming at increasing the placement potential, see section 2.3. This could be
an explanation for the small positive effect on the reemployment probability. How-
ever, later on, the composition of training courses changed towards longer courses
intended to provide substantive skills. These additional skills could improve the
quality of the match between participants and employers thus increasing the em-
ployment stability, once a participant finds a job. However, these additional skills
do not seem to help finding a job at a faster rate.
Also, changes in the search behavior of East Germans due to a better understanding
of the labor market and the benefit system in unified Germany might play a role
for the differences. Shortly after unification, unemployed East Germans, not being
used to a labor market in a market economy, probably tended to accept quickly
a new job without focussing on wages and a high expected job duration. As a
result, a positive effect of training programs might show up in an increase of their
reemployment probability rather than in an increase of the probability to remain
employed. Later on, individuals searching for a job became perhaps more aware
of the importance of finding a ‘good’ job, which is not only important for their
job stability, but also for the level of potential future unemployment benefits being
defined by the earnings in the last job. In addition, the entitlement for transfer
payments is prolonged by taking part in a training program for some time after
the program, lowering the opportunity costs of job search for participants compared
to other unemployed individuals. Thus, participants tended to search longer to
find a ‘better’ job match resulting in a positive effect on the probability to remain
employed.
However, an important caveat regarding the interpretation of the CDiDHR results
is in order here. Since our estimated TT conditions on previous employment, it is
likely that the estimates for the probability to remain employed overestimate and
the estimates for the reemployment probability underestimate the true TT for the
FTR treatment sample as a whole, see section 3.3. For this group, it might well be
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the case that reemployment chances increase on average and the positive effect on
employment stability is smaller.
Another feature of the results which should be explained are the changes in the
long–run preprogram differences. The CDiDHR estimator matches participants and
nonparticipants month by month conditional upon the same employment status
in the previous month. Shortly after the unification the labor market was quite
turbulent. Everybody faced a high risk of becoming unemployed, resulting in a
relatively small difference in the long–run preprogram difference in the probability to
remain employed. However, some individuals found quickly another job and did not
participate in a training program, leading to a large long–run preprogram difference
in the reemployment probability at the begin of the 90’s. Later on, unemployment
became persistent. The difference in transitions out of nonemployment between
participants and nonparticipants was then less pronounced.22 The change in the
long–run preprogramm differences in the probability to remain employed most likely
reflects the stricter targeting of labor market policy on unemployed individuals.
Let us now turn to the results for the multiple, sequential treatments TR–TR and
TR–JC. For the combined effect, the evaluation period starts at the begin of the
respective program sequence, whereas for the incremental effect it starts at the begin
of the second treatment. Figures 13, 15, 17, and 19 show the estimates for the com-
bined effects. The combined effects on the transition probabilities are mostly close
to zero and always insignificant. This implies that ex ante it was not a successful
strategy on average to assign the group of participants to the program sequences
TR–TR or TR–JC. Also the incremental effects on the reemployment probability
are not significantly different from zero (figures 14 and 18). However, we do find sig-
nificantly positive incremental effects for the probability to remain employed (figures
16 and 20), especially for TR–JC. Note that the number of preprogram observations
conditioning on being employed in the previous month is particularly small in these
cases. Taken literally, the results obtained imply that the participation in a sec-
ond program after a first training program improved employment stability for the
group of participants. Put differently, even though the two treatments combined do
not appear successful ex ante, ex post after the first training program, the second
program seems partly successful.
5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the average employment effects for participants in Public
Sponsored Training in East Germany during the time period 1990 to 1999. Mod-
eling employment as a state–dependent outcome variable, we develop a new semi-
22Note that this explanation of the changes in the long–run preprogram difference does not
violate the assumption of permanent fixed effects since participants change over time.
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parametric conditional difference–in–differences estimator for the treatment effect.
For the implementation of this estimator, we use the transition rates between em-
ployment and nonemployment as our outcome variables and we compare the results
with the effects on the employment rate per se. We account for the likely occur-
rence of Ashenfelter’s Dip caused by anticipation effects and institutional program
participation rules. In addition, we develop a heuristic approach to estimate the
effects of multiple sequential program participation. Thus, we estimate the effect
of treatment–on–the–treated for individuals who participated in training as their
first treatment. We also consider the cases where participation in a second training
program or in a job creation scheme occurs afterwards. We take account of the
sampling error in matching by bootstrapping.
We find negative effects of training on the employment probability. However, tak-
ing account of the state dependency of the employment process, the bleak picture
concerning the effects of training brightens. This is especially the case for the reem-
ployment probabilities. Concerning training programs which took place shortly after
reunification, we find some positive program effects on the reemployment probability
- although we have been twice conservative in modeling the effects. First, our align-
ment of the difference–in–differences estimation on a long–run preprogram difference
is conservative (which is of course also true for the other estimates). Secondly, due
to the potential positive correlation between the individual specific and the program
effect when being nonemployed in the previous month, for which we do not control,
we estimate a lower bound for the reemployment probability. Thus, our results indi-
cate that modeling transition rates is more appropriate and more informative than
using unconditional employment rates. Using only employment rates as success cri-
terion might result in misleading conclusions concerning the effectiveness of ALMP
programs.
Further results include that the program effects depend heavily on the time the
programs took place corresponding to the institutional changes during the 1990s.
Combined sequences of two programs with a first training program (e.g. a combina-
tion “training first and then job experience through a Job Creation program”) are
not successful from an ex ante point of view. In contrast, the incremental effects of
the second treatment appear to have slightly positive effects on the probability to
remain employed. Again, there is no positive effect on the reemployment probability
when being nonemployed.
Overall, our results are not as negative as previous results in the literature and
it is unlikely that training on average reduces considerably the future employment
chances of participants. We also find noticeable differences among different treat-
ment types. At the same time, it remains questionable whether on average training
programs are justified in light of the large costs incurred. Our study makes some
methodological progress, particularly regarding modeling the dynamic employment
process in the context of program evaluation. In future research, we intend to re-
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fine the estimation of the unconditional effect of treatment–on–the–treated. Finally,
our results are also of interest for other transformation countries considering the
introduction of training programs as part of ALMP.
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Appendix
Figure 1: Entries into Training in East Germany, Annual Totals
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Figure 2: Participation Stocks in Training and Expenditure per Participant / Year,
Annual Average
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Figure 3: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for FTR – Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
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Figure 4: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for FTR – Employment
in Previous Month
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Figure 5: Overlap of Distributions of Propensity Score Index for TR–TR – Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
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Figure 6: Overlap of Distributions of the Propensity Score Index for TR–TR –
Employment in Previous Month
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Figure 7: Differences in Outcome Variable (Matched Sample): First TR Beginning
in Two–Year–Interval 90/91,. . . ,97/98
First Program is TR – Differences in Outcome Variable after Matching
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Figure 8: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiD – Evaluation Starts after End of
Treatment
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Figure 9: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Nonemployment in the Previous
Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 10: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Nonemployment in the Previ-
ous Month – Evaluation Starts after End of Treatment
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Figure 11: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Employment in the Previous
Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 12: Employment Effects of FTR – CDiDHR – Employment in the Previous
Month – Evaluation Starts after End of Treatment
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Figure 13: Combined Employment Effects of TR–TR – CDiDHR – Nonemployment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 14: Incremental Employment Effects of TR–TR – CDiDHR – Nonemploy-
ment in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 15: Combined Employment Effects of TR–TR – CDiDHR – Employment in
Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 16: Incremental Employment Effects of TR-TR – CDiDHR – Employment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 17: Combined Employment Effects of TR–JC – CDiDHR – Nonemployment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 18: Incremental Employment Effects of TR–JC – CDiDHR – Nonemployment
in Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 19: Combined Employment Effects of TR–JC – CDiDHR – Employment in
Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Figure 20: Incremental Employment Effects of TR-JC – CDiDHR – Employment in
Previous Month – Evaluation Starts after Begin of Treatment
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Table 1: Program Participation (number of individuals) in the LMM–SA during
1990 and 1999
One Program JCa TRb
At least once 689 1021
As first program 484 889
Program Sequencesc JC–JC JC–TR JC alone
First and Second 105 113 266
Program Sequences TR–JC TR–TR training alone
First and Second 176 150 563
a: Training b: Job Creation Scheme
c: For instance, TR–JC indicates that a first participation in training and a
second treatment in JC occurred
Table 2: Propensity Score Estimations
FTR TR–TR TR–JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Constant -1.036 ( 0.161 ) -2.084 ( 0.140) -1.625 ( 0.211 )
Age in 1990: Age 25–34 is omitted category
Age 35–44 -0.094 ( 0.047 ) -0.078 ( 0.081) 0.140 ( 0.084 )
Age 45–50 -0.311 ( 0.058 ) -0.342 ( 0.109 ) 0.224 ( 0.094 )
Labor Market Region: Dessau is missing category
Halberstadt -0.109 ( 0.090 ) -0.253 ( 0.164) -0.026 ( 0.144 )
Halle -0.163 ( 0.077 ) -0.126 ( 0.128 ) -0.423 ( 0.137 )
Magdeburg -0.126 ( 0.073 ) -0.121 ( 0.121 ) -0.140 ( 0.117 )
Merseburg -0.110 ( 0.082 ) -0.156 ( 0.140 ) -0.176 ( 0.136 )
Sangerhausen 0.009 ( 0.087 ) -0.093 ( 0.149 ) 0.154 ( 0.132 )
Stendal -0.214 ( 0.097 ) -0.414 ( 0.190 ) -0.181 ( 0.159 )
Wittenberg -0.146 ( 0.111 ) -0.183 ( 0.193 ) 0.036 ( 0.166 )
Professional education (all): Unskilled, semi–skilled or other skills
are missing category
Skilled Worker 0.097 ( 0.156 ) - ( - ) -0.645 ( 0.211 )
Craftsman -0.020 ( 0.176 ) -0.182 ( 0.269 ) -0.915 ( 0.312 )
Technical college 0.271 ( 0.173 ) 0.129 ( 0.221 ) -0.391 ( 0.244 )
University education 0.204 ( 0.159 ) 0.288 ( 0.144 ) -0.295 ( 0.204 )
Professional education (women)
Skilled worker 0.500 ( 0.063 ) 0.762 ( 0.119 ) 0.747 ( 0.122 )
Craftsman 0.819 ( 0.182 ) 0.630 ( 0.397 ) 1.295 ( 0.322 )
Technical college 0.035 ( 0.104 ) 0.456 ( 0.214 ) 0.074 ( 0.190 )
University education 0.137 ( 0.082 ) 0.191 ( 0.143 ) 0.296 ( 0.127 )
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Table 3: Balancing Properties of Matching for Participation
in FTR, Evaluation Starts at the Beginning of the Program
Means of Variable in Subgroups
Variable All Nonpar– Parti– Matched Nonpar– Parti– Matched
ticipants cipants Nonpart. ticipants cipants Nonpart.
averaged over prev– averaged over prev–
iously nonemployed iously employed
Age 25–34 0.37 0.27 0.40 0.36 0.37 0.45 0.43
Age 35–44 0.40 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.41
Age 45–50 0.23 0.37 0.19 0.26 0.23 0.14 0.16
Dessau 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.14 0.14
Halberstadt 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.09
Halle 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.18
Magdeburg 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.24
Merseburg 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.13
Sangerhausen 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.11
Stendal 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Wittenberg 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Unskilled, semi- or other skilled 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
Skilled worker 0.43 0.50 0.50 0.57 0.41 0.46 0.46
Craftsman 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06
Technical college 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.20
University education 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.27 0.27
Female 0.48 0.54 0.64 0.65 0.45 0.55 0.58
Female unskilled worker 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female skilled worker 0.21 0.30 0.34 0.42 0.17 0.27 0.29
Craftswoman 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02
Female and technical college 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.14
Female and university education 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.13
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Table 4: Balancing Properties of Matching for Participation
in TR–TR (Combined Effect), Evaluation Starts at the Be-
ginning of the Program
Means of Variable in Subgroups
Variable All Nonpar– Parti– Matched Nonpar– Parti– Matched
ticipants cipants Nonpart. ticipants cipants Nonpart.
averaged over prev– averaged over prev–
iously nonemployed iously employed
Age 25–34 0.37 0.32 0.43 0.41 0.38 0.45 0.44
Age 35–44 0.40 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.43 0.42
Age 45–50 0.23 0.30 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.15
Dessau 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.14 0.15
Halberstadt 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07
Halle 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.20
Magdeburg 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.25
Merseburg 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.13
Sangerhausen 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.10
Stendal 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05
Wittenberg 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
Unskilled, semi- or other skilled 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01
Skilled worker 0.43 0.50 0.53 0.62 0.41 0.52 0.53
Craftsman 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04
Technical college 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.21
University education 0.27 0.20 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.22
Female 0.48 0.57 0.79 0.79 0.46 0.68 0.67
Female unskilled worker 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01
Female skilled worker 0.21 0.31 0.46 0.56 0.18 0.36 0.40
Craftswomen 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Female and technical college 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.17
Female and university education 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.11
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Table 5: Coefficient estimates for CDiD
FTR
Parameter Coef. bootstrap – s.e.
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.109538 ( 0.031724 )
τ -0.010506 ( 1.62E-03 )
τ2 7.93E-05 ( 1.43E-05 )
Outcome–equation
I(t1 = −6) 0.015666 ( 0.051966 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.053436 ( 0.051006 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.098527 ( 0.049093 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.147712 ( 0.047869 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.18752 ( 0.046773 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.250343 ( 0.047172 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.331277 ( 0.072718 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.310247 ( 0.073391 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.293056 ( 0.072545 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.287756 ( 0.07347 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.27302 ( 0.073619 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.265125 ( 0.073884 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.254978 ( 0.074463 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.24921 ( 0.074907 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.236731 ( 0.074903 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.222417 ( 0.074433 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.210578 ( 0.074053 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.196867 ( 0.074775 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.181907 ( 0.074531 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.178723 ( 0.07364 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.167247 ( 0.074247 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.162639 ( 0.073198 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.157038 ( 0.073196 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.150819 ( 0.072676 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.144263 ( 0.073454 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.146938 ( 0.073612 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.148433 ( 0.074218 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.136203 ( 0.073933 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.139326 ( 0.074613 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.149236 ( 0.074444 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.154556 ( 0.072969 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.146676 ( 0.073267 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.145388 ( 0.073807 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.132021 ( 0.0731 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.137155 ( 0.073106 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.133065 ( 0.073812 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.131043 ( 0.073167 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.132572 ( 0.072657 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.125412 ( 0.072885 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.122935 ( 0.073045 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 5: Coefficient estimates <continued>
FTR
Parameter Coef. bootstrap – s.e.
I(t1 = 35) -0.117068 ( 0.074169 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.113323 ( 0.073629 )
AD : τ -4.41E-03 ( 2.01E-03 )
AD : τ2 1.53E-05 ( 1.72E-05 )
PO : τ -2.89E-03 ( 3.63E-03 )
PO : τ2 3.63E-05 ( 3.49E-05 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(ad(τ) ≤ τ < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(τ > 0)
comb.: combined effect of first and second program
incr.: incremental effect of second program
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Table 6: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – FTR – Nonem-
ployment in Previous Month
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const -0.065 ( 0.023 ) -0.065 ( 0.023 )
t 5.45E-04 ( 8.11E-04 ) 5.45E-04 ( 8.11E-04 )
t2 1.93E-06 ( 6.61E-06 ) 1.93E-06 ( 6.61E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) -0.027 ( 0.049 ) -0.035 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.034 ( 0.050 ) -0.041 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.033 ( 0.049 ) -0.042 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.039 ( 0.048 ) -0.048 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.040 ( 0.048 ) -0.049 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.043 ( 0.048 ) -0.052 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 1) 0.029 ( 0.037 ) 0.314 ( 0.050 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.023 ( 0.037 ) 0.090 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 3) 0.023 ( 0.036 ) 0.097 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.034 ( 0.038 ) 0.091 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.030 ( 0.037 ) 0.099 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.041 ( 0.036 ) 0.110 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.055 ( 0.038 ) 0.099 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.042 ( 0.037 ) 0.114 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.037 ( 0.038 ) 0.120 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.054 ( 0.037 ) 0.092 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 11) 0.040 ( 0.037 ) 0.101 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 12) 0.053 ( 0.038 ) 0.107 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 13) 0.063 ( 0.039 ) 0.125 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.063 ( 0.038 ) 0.091 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.058 ( 0.038 ) 0.109 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.046 ( 0.038 ) 0.105 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.070 ( 0.039 ) 0.117 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = 18) 0.050 ( 0.038 ) 0.094 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 19) 0.064 ( 0.039 ) 0.102 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.048 ( 0.038 ) 0.097 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.049 ( 0.039 ) 0.089 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.060 ( 0.039 ) 0.103 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.046 ( 0.037 ) 0.092 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.059 ( 0.038 ) 0.092 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.059 ( 0.037 ) 0.098 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 26) 0.071 ( 0.039 ) 0.115 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 27) 0.048 ( 0.038 ) 0.101 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.059 ( 0.038 ) 0.113 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.054 ( 0.039 ) 0.098 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 30) 0.087 ( 0.040 ) 0.098 ( 0.048 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 6: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 31) 0.046 ( 0.037 ) 0.097 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.068 ( 0.040 ) 0.095 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.076 ( 0.038 ) 0.115 ( 0.046 )
I(t1 = 34) 0.045 ( 0.037 ) 0.099 ( 0.045 )
I(t1 = 35) 0.065 ( 0.041 ) 0.107 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = 36) 0.077 ( 0.039 ) 0.098 ( 0.046 )
AD:τ 1.83E-03 ( 1.98E-03 ) 2.21E-03 ( 1.98E-03 )
AD:τ2 -2.08E-05 ( 1.76E-05 ) -2.40E-05 ( 1.76E-05 )
PO:τ -1.19E-03 ( 1.31E-03 ) -2.57E-03 ( 1.65E-03 )
PO:τ2 5.28E-06 ( 1.05E-05 ) 1.61E-05 ( 1.35E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 6.54E-03 ( 1.65E-02 ) -7.19E-03 ( 1.69E-02 )
Age 45–50 -1.40E-02 ( 1.62E-02 ) -2.81E-02 ( 1.81E-02 )
Halberstadt 5.19E-04 ( 1.74E-02 ) -1.90E-02 ( 1.90E-02 )
Halle -2.33E-02 ( 2.48E-02 ) -3.49E-02 ( 3.17E-02 )
Magdeburg 5.95E-03 ( 1.53E-02 ) -4.47E-03 ( 1.70E-02 )
Merseburg -5.56E-03 ( 1.82E-02 ) -2.23E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Sangerhausen 1.42E-02 ( 1.72E-02 ) 2.92E-03 ( 1.96E-02 )
Stendal -2.51E-02 ( 2.95E-02 ) -4.48E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Wittenberg -8.81E-02 ( 7.32E-02 ) -1.15E-01 ( 8.92E-02 )
Skilled Worker -2.78E-02 ( 3.32E-02 ) 2.46E-02 ( 2.79E-02 )
Craftsman 5.39E-05 ( 2.38E-02 ) 3.03E-02 ( 3.50E-02 )
Technical college -2.69E-02 ( 3.04E-02 ) 1.11E-02 ( 4.19E-02 )
University education -3.35E-02 ( 3.40E-02 ) -1.89E-02 ( 4.15E-02 )
Female skilled worker 1.86E-02 ( 2.60E-02 ) -2.01E-02 ( 2.09E-02 )
Craftswoman 2.37E-02 ( 4.28E-02 ) 1.74E-02 ( 4.94E-02 )
Female and technical college 2.12E-02 ( 2.88E-02 ) -5.28E-03 ( 3.83E-02 )
Female and university education 2.70E-02 ( 3.25E-02 ) 3.04E-02 ( 4.04E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 7: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – FTR – Employ-
ment in Previous Month
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.005 ( 0.006 ) 0.005 ( 0.006 )
t -1.22E-03 ( 2.69E-04 ) -1.22E-03 ( 2.69E-04 )
t2 7.33E-06 ( 2.48E-06 ) 7.33E-06 ( 2.48E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) -0.011 ( 0.050 ) -0.008 ( 0.051 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.080 ( 0.048 ) -0.078 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.068 ( 0.043 ) -0.068 ( 0.044 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.099 ( 0.039 ) -0.100 ( 0.040 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.096 ( 0.033 ) -0.097 ( 0.033 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.141 ( 0.038 ) -0.151 ( 0.038 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.016 ( 0.024 ) -0.007 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.016 ( 0.025 ) -0.008 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.060 ( 0.043 ) -0.035 ( 0.018 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.014 ( 0.020 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.001 ( 0.025 ) -0.011 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.007 ( 0.022 ) -0.028 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.010 ( 0.025 ) -0.032 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.008 ( 0.024 ) -0.019 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.007 ( 0.022 ) -0.012 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.010 ( 0.021 ) -0.009 ( 0.014 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.027 ( 0.022 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.020 ( 0.020 ) -0.022 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.041 ( 0.023 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.004 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.031 ( 0.023 ) -0.022 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.009 ( 0.016 ) -0.014 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.012 ( 0.018 ) -0.004 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.030 ( 0.019 ) -0.009 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.022 ( 0.018 ) -0.017 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.017 ( 0.018 ) -0.021 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.018 ( 0.017 ) -0.007 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.000 ( 0.017 ) -0.015 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.015 ( 0.018 ) -0.033 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.020 ( 0.018 ) -0.031 ( 0.017 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.010 ( 0.017 ) -0.017 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.005 ( 0.017 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.028 ( 0.020 ) -0.016 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.005 ( 0.018 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.011 ( 0.018 ) -0.013 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.024 ( 0.018 ) -0.019 ( 0.016 )
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Table 7: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month End
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 31) 0.001 ( 0.017 ) -0.016 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.010 ( 0.018 ) -0.007 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.010 ( 0.018 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.020 ( 0.019 ) -0.008 ( 0.015 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.028 ( 0.021 ) -0.011 ( 0.016 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.010 ( 0.019 ) -0.014 ( 0.016 )
AD:τ 1.27E-04 ( 1.66E-03 ) 2.62E-04 ( 1.67E-03 )
AD:τ2 -8.62E-06 ( 1.38E-05 ) -1.06E-05 ( 1.38E-05 )
PO:τ 1.67E-03 ( 1.00E-03 ) 1.95E-03 ( 8.69E-04 )
PO:τ2 -8.36E-06 ( 9.53E-06 ) -1.15E-05 ( 8.49E-06 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -3.48E-03 ( 9.25E-03 ) -6.46E-03 ( 8.75E-03 )
Age 45–50 2.68E-02 ( 2.66E-02 ) 2.41E-02 ( 2.21E-02 )
Halberstadt 2.14E-02 ( 1.99E-02 ) 1.81E-02 ( 1.79E-02 )
Halle 2.78E-02 ( 2.55E-02 ) 2.27E-02 ( 2.05E-02 )
Magdeburg 1.29E-02 ( 1.48E-02 ) 1.05E-02 ( 1.22E-02 )
Merseburg 2.01E-02 ( 1.54E-02 ) 3.12E-02 ( 1.44E-02 )
Sangerhausen 9.00E-03 ( 1.60E-02 ) 5.61E-03 ( 1.39E-02 )
Stendal 1.61E-02 ( 1.73E-02 ) 1.52E-02 ( 1.81E-02 )
Wittenberg 8.23E-03 ( 1.97E-02 ) 5.98E-03 ( 1.68E-02 )
Skilled Worker -3.27E-02 ( 3.50E-02 ) -1.22E-02 ( 3.92E-02 )
Craftsman -2.92E-02 ( 3.61E-02 ) -1.65E-02 ( 3.95E-02 )
Technical college -3.31E-02 ( 3.57E-02 ) -2.07E-03 ( 4.08E-02 )
University education -3.84E-02 ( 3.43E-02 ) -2.12E-02 ( 3.89E-02 )
Female skilled worker 4.50E-04 ( 1.84E-02 ) -2.71E-04 ( 1.55E-02 )
Craftswoman -2.15E-02 ( 3.59E-02 ) -2.87E-03 ( 2.85E-02 )
Female and technical college -2.11E-03 ( 2.15E-02 ) -8.30E-03 ( 2.28E-02 )
Female and university education 2.12E-03 ( 1.64E-02 ) 7.07E-03 ( 1.40E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 8: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–TR –
nonemployment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const -0.066 ( 0.037 ) -0.011 ( 0.029 )
t 1.62E-03 ( 1.46E-03 ) -5.12E-04 ( 7.82E-04 )
t2 -1.28E-05 ( 1.31E-05 ) 5.53E-06 ( 5.35E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) 0.013 ( 0.067 ) -0.062 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = −5) 0.008 ( 0.066 ) -0.052 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = −4) 0.013 ( 0.066 ) -0.043 ( 0.059 )
I(t1 = −3) 0.012 ( 0.065 ) -0.059 ( 0.058 )
I(t1 = −2) 0.009 ( 0.065 ) -0.060 ( 0.058 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.003 ( 0.068 ) -0.069 ( 0.061 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.017 ( 0.089 ) -0.235 ( 0.204 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.015 ( 0.088 ) -0.232 ( 0.204 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.017 ( 0.089 ) -0.234 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.020 ( 0.089 ) -0.211 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.014 ( 0.089 ) -0.225 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.015 ( 0.089 ) -0.244 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.019 ( 0.089 ) -0.232 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.014 ( 0.090 ) -0.232 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.013 ( 0.089 ) -0.230 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.018 ( 0.093 ) -0.230 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.015 ( 0.089 ) -0.222 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.018 ( 0.089 ) -0.215 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 13) 0.002 ( 0.093 ) -0.211 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.011 ( 0.090 ) -0.229 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.019 ( 0.098 ) -0.237 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.014 ( 0.096 ) -0.208 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.021 ( 0.094 ) -0.228 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.014 ( 0.091 ) -0.216 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.013 ( 0.091 ) -0.203 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.214 ( 0.206 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.009 ( 0.090 ) -0.210 ( 0.207 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.237 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.010 ( 0.090 ) -0.223 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.022 ( 0.090 ) -0.195 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.012 ( 0.090 ) -0.210 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 26) 0.025 ( 0.099 ) -0.237 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.012 ( 0.090 ) -0.224 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.005 ( 0.092 ) -0.224 ( 0.211 )
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Table 8: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 29) 0.026 ( 0.097 ) -0.223 ( 0.212 )
I(t1 = 30) 0.009 ( 0.092 ) -0.237 ( 0.209 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.010 ( 0.089 ) -0.223 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.007 ( 0.089 ) -0.206 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.012 ( 0.093 ) -0.220 ( 0.210 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.005 ( 0.089 ) -0.221 ( 0.213 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.008 ( 0.089 ) -0.241 ( 0.211 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.013 ( 0.089 ) -0.223 ( 0.210 )
AD:τ 1.34E-05 ( 2.95E-03 ) 1.82E-03 ( 1.57E-03 )
AD:τ2 -2.12E-06 ( 2.80E-05 ) -1.28E-05 ( 1.03E-05 )
PO:τ 3.62E-04 ( 3.68E-03 ) 6.61E-03 ( 5.77E-03 )
PO:τ2 -3.23E-06 ( 3.36E-05 ) -4.39E-05 ( 3.84E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -1.56E-02 ( 4.56E-02 ) -1.29E-02 ( 2.32E-02 )
Age 45–50 5.54E-03 ( 5.43E-02 ) 8.92E-03 ( 2.95E-02 )
Halberstadt 3.16E-02 ( 4.70E-02 ) 5.70E-02 ( 5.30E-02 )
Halle 2.90E-02 ( 4.80E-02 ) 3.84E-02 ( 4.32E-02 )
Magdeburg 3.22E-02 ( 4.53E-02 ) 4.28E-02 ( 5.30E-02 )
Merseburg 2.60E-02 ( 4.53E-02 ) 5.02E-02 ( 5.05E-02 )
Sangerhausen 2.95E-02 ( 5.16E-02 ) 5.49E-02 ( 4.33E-02 )
Stendal 2.79E-02 ( 4.62E-02 ) 3.58E-02 ( 5.61E-02 )
Wittenberg -1.74E-01 ( 2.02E-01 ) 2.84E-02 ( 3.81E-02 )
Skilled Worker - ( - ) - ( - )
Craftsman -8.01E-02 ( 1.34E-01 ) -1.52E-02 ( 5.37E-02 )
Technical college -7.34E-02 ( 1.19E-01 ) -4.57E-02 ( 5.38E-02 )
University education -7.28E-02 ( 1.24E-01 ) -1.35E-01 ( 9.07E-02 )
Female skilled worker - ( - ) -3.95E-02 ( 3.19E-02 )
Craftswoman - ( - ) -7.93E-03 ( 5.48E-02 )
Female and technical college -9.49E-02 ( 1.26E-01 ) 9.53E-03 ( 3.35E-02 )
Female and university education 3.06E-02 ( 6.58E-02 ) 1.20E-01 ( 6.71E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 9: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–TR – Em-
ployment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.000 ( 0.017 ) -0.159 ( 0.055 )
t -1.19E-03 ( 7.88E-04 ) 1.58E-03 ( 2.02E-03 )
t2 9.24E-06 ( 8.27E-06 ) -7.81E-06 ( 1.61E-05 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −6) 0.134 ( 0.179 ) -0.280 ( 1.371 )
I(t1 = −5) 0.111 ( 0.184 ) -0.374 ( 1.368 )
I(t1 = −4) 0.027 ( 0.169 ) -0.350 ( 1.367 )
I(t1 = −3) 0.011 ( 0.157 ) -0.257 ( 1.364 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.106 ( 0.146 ) -0.331 ( 1.343 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.058 ( 0.137 ) -0.351 ( 1.364 )
I(t1 = 1) 0.111 ( 0.130 ) 0.207 ( 0.442 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.108 ( 0.125 ) 0.257 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.147 ( 0.233 ) 0.243 ( 0.442 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.075 ( 0.109 ) 0.254 ( 0.439 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.039 ( 0.103 ) 0.283 ( 0.440 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.028 ( 0.103 ) 0.278 ( 0.440 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.034 ( 0.101 ) 0.180 ( 0.449 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.032 ( 0.102 ) 0.279 ( 0.446 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.030 ( 0.101 ) 0.184 ( 0.460 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.056 ( 0.104 ) 0.278 ( 0.451 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.004 ( 0.107 ) 0.288 ( 0.452 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.058 ( 0.129 ) 0.291 ( 0.446 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.103 ( 0.131 ) 0.366 ( 0.447 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.030 ( 0.102 ) 0.241 ( 0.454 )
I(t1 = 15) 0.030 ( 0.103 ) 0.324 ( 0.441 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.019 ( 0.102 ) 0.298 ( 0.431 )
I(t1 = 17) 0.064 ( 0.102 ) 0.286 ( 0.427 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.005 ( 0.110 ) 0.351 ( 0.434 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.050 ( 0.108 ) 0.344 ( 0.435 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.012 ( 0.106 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.014 ( 0.105 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.004 ( 0.109 ) 0.345 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.006 ( 0.095 ) 0.336 ( 0.437 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.113 ( 0.119 ) 0.275 ( 0.436 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.033 ( 0.098 ) 0.332 ( 0.434 )
I(t1 = 26) -0.025 ( 0.109 ) 0.333 ( 0.435 )
I(t1 = 27) 0.042 ( 0.102 ) 0.330 ( 0.433 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.048 ( 0.102 ) 0.377 ( 0.448 )
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Table 9: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of Second TR
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of Second TR
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 29) 0.005 ( 0.110 ) 0.402 ( 0.447 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.016 ( 0.112 ) 0.405 ( 0.448 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.066 ( 0.103 ) 0.397 ( 0.445 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.007 ( 0.106 ) 0.330 ( 0.462 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.027 ( 0.111 ) 0.391 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.041 ( 0.109 ) 0.390 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.033 ( 0.119 ) 0.395 ( 0.443 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.031 ( 0.117 ) 0.392 ( 0.448 )
AD:τ -4.09E-03 ( 6.84E-03 ) 6.09E-03 ( 3.77E-02 )
AD:τ2 1.04E-05 ( 6.51E-05 ) -2.41E-05 ( 2.40E-04 )
PO:τ -1.40E-03 ( 5.62E-03 ) -4.71E-03 ( 1.35E-02 )
PO:τ2 2.49E-05 ( 6.86E-05 ) 4.54E-05 ( 1.02E-04 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 1.83E-02 ( 4.14E-02 ) -7.00E-02 ( 1.77E-01 )
Age 45–50 2.07E-01 ( 1.94E-01 ) - ( - )
Halberstadt 3.78E-02 ( 8.53E-02 ) -4.41E-01 ( 6.82E-01 )
Halle 1.75E-01 ( 1.07E-01 ) -3.28E-01 ( 6.53E-01 )
Magdeburg 2.40E-02 ( 6.62E-02 ) -1.88E-01 ( 6.70E-01 )
Merseburg 4.97E-02 ( 7.21E-02 ) -3.11E-01 ( 6.69E-01 )
Sangerhausen -1.47E-02 ( 7.70E-02 ) -3.23E-01 ( 6.57E-01 )
Stendal -1.17E-02 ( 1.06E-01 ) -4.14E-01 ( 6.63E-01 )
Wittenberg 1.51E-01 ( 1.78E-01 ) -4.84E-01 ( 7.57E-01 )
Skilled Worker - ( - ) - ( - )
Craftsman -7.76E-02 ( 1.12E-01 ) - ( - )
Technical college -1.96E-01 ( 2.16E-01 ) - ( - )
University education -2.74E-01 ( 1.67E-01 ) 3.53E-01 ( 3.29E-01 )
Female skilled worker -1.05E-01 ( 7.43E-02 ) 2.11E-01 ( 1.65E-01 )
Craftswoman -1.11E-01 ( 1.00E-01 ) - ( - )
Female and technical college 1.21E-01 ( 1.55E-01 ) 1.07E-01 ( 1.66E-01 )
Female and university education 1.72E-01 ( 1.07E-01 ) -1.51E-01 ( 3.64E-01 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 10: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–JC –
nonemployment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const -0.050 ( 0.048 ) -0.008 ( 0.031 )
t 8.72E-04 ( 1.74E-03 ) -5.70E-04 ( 9.03E-04 )
t2 -5.37E-06 ( 1.44E-05 ) 4.76E-06 ( 6.27E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −9) - ( - ) -0.013 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −8) - ( - ) -0.025 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −7) - ( - ) -0.032 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −6) 0.007 ( 0.080 ) -0.027 ( 0.049 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.003 ( 0.081 ) -0.028 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = −4) -0.036 ( 0.079 ) -0.029 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.023 ( 0.081 ) -0.029 ( 0.048 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.025 ( 0.081 ) -0.030 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.031 ( 0.081 ) -0.028 ( 0.047 )
I(t1 = 1) -0.041 ( 0.084 ) -0.007 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 2) -0.042 ( 0.085 ) 0.005 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 3) -0.046 ( 0.085 ) 0.003 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 4) -0.051 ( 0.085 ) 0.013 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 5) -0.043 ( 0.084 ) 0.002 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 6) -0.039 ( 0.084 ) 0.003 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 7) -0.062 ( 0.086 ) 0.006 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 8) -0.040 ( 0.086 ) 0.002 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 9) -0.039 ( 0.084 ) 0.010 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 10) -0.040 ( 0.085 ) 0.009 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.039 ( 0.085 ) 0.006 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 12) -0.050 ( 0.085 ) 0.031 ( 0.057 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.024 ( 0.087 ) -0.007 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 14) -0.037 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.041 ( 0.084 ) 0.007 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 16) -0.045 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.005 ( 0.089 ) 0.014 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.034 ( 0.085 ) 0.003 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 19) -0.040 ( 0.085 ) 0.014 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 20) -0.029 ( 0.087 ) 0.003 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 21) -0.033 ( 0.085 ) 0.008 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 22) -0.037 ( 0.084 ) 0.003 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 23) -0.037 ( 0.084 ) -0.003 ( 0.052 )
I(t1 = 24) -0.030 ( 0.085 ) 0.059 ( 0.060 )
I(t1 = 25) -0.025 ( 0.086 ) 0.019 ( 0.057 )
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Table 10: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: One Month after One Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 26) -0.042 ( 0.085 ) 0.019 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.030 ( 0.086 ) 0.010 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 28) -0.016 ( 0.091 ) 0.018 ( 0.055 )
I(t1 = 29) -0.036 ( 0.085 ) 0.020 ( 0.056 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.021 ( 0.088 ) 0.024 ( 0.056 )
I(t1 = 31) -0.048 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 32) -0.030 ( 0.087 ) 0.006 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 33) -0.026 ( 0.086 ) 0.003 ( 0.054 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.041 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 35) -0.031 ( 0.086 ) 0.004 ( 0.053 )
I(t1 = 36) -0.049 ( 0.085 ) 0.035 ( 0.058 )
AD:τ 2.07E-04 ( 2.96E-03 ) 7.82E-04 ( 1.39E-03 )
AD:τ2 -1.96E-06 ( 2.63E-05 ) -6.50E-06 ( 9.68E-06 )
PO:τ 1.16E-03 ( 3.25E-03 ) 1.53E-04 ( 1.62E-03 )
PO:τ2 -1.31E-05 ( 3.00E-05 ) -1.98E-06 ( 1.16E-05 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -1.96E-03 ( 3.09E-02 ) -1.85E-02 ( 1.33E-02 )
Age 45–50 -3.19E-02 ( 3.97E-02 ) 3.59E-03 ( 1.78E-02 )
Halberstadt -5.33E-02 ( 4.62E-02 ) 5.34E-03 ( 2.69E-02 )
Halle -1.63E-01 ( 1.47E-01 ) -4.34E-03 ( 1.97E-02 )
Magdeburg -5.78E-02 ( 4.96E-02 ) -2.13E-02 ( 2.54E-02 )
Merseburg -7.08E-02 ( 5.43E-02 ) -1.21E-02 ( 2.18E-02 )
Sangerhausen -6.33E-02 ( 4.99E-02 ) 1.08E-03 ( 1.79E-02 )
Stendal -3.89E-02 ( 5.44E-02 ) 1.63E-02 ( 3.07E-02 )
Wittenberg -1.09E-01 ( 7.63E-02 ) 2.36E-02 ( 3.27E-02 )
Skilled Worker 1.98E-02 ( 6.64E-02 ) 1.24E-02 ( 1.96E-02 )
Craftsman 7.19E-02 ( 9.11E-02 ) 2.55E-02 ( 4.87E-02 )
Technical college -6.51E-02 ( 8.33E-02 ) -1.71E-01 ( 1.75E-01 )
University education -1.21E-01 ( 1.22E-01 ) 9.95E-03 ( 1.98E-02 )
Female skilled worker -2.02E-02 ( 6.82E-02 ) -1.39E-02 ( 1.53E-02 )
Craftswoman -7.82E-02 ( 1.07E-01 ) -1.68E-02 ( 4.82E-02 )
Female and technical college 7.32E-02 ( 8.06E-02 ) 1.69E-01 ( 1.74E-01 )
Female and university education 1.10E-01 ( 1.09E-01 ) 2.40E-03 ( 1.33E-02 )
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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Table 11: Coefficient estimates for CDiDHR – TR–JC – Em-
ployment in Previous Month
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Long–run preprogram difference
Const 0.021 ( 0.016 ) -0.031 ( 0.026 )
t -2.03E-03 ( 8.81E-04 ) -2.23E-03 ( 1.18E-03 )
t2 1.24E-05 ( 9.29E-06 ) 1.34E-05 ( 9.27E-06 )
Outcome–Equation
I(t1 = −9) - ( - ) 1.194 ( 0.639 )
I(t1 = −8) - ( - ) 1.234 ( 0.590 )
I(t1 = −7) - ( - ) 1.160 ( 0.571 )
I(t1 = −6) 0.170 ( 0.138 ) 1.261 ( 0.568 )
I(t1 = −5) -0.025 ( 0.150 ) 0.858 ( 0.597 )
I(t1 = −4) 0.031 ( 0.127 ) 0.883 ( 0.366 )
I(t1 = −3) -0.053 ( 0.110 ) 0.635 ( 0.423 )
I(t1 = −2) -0.040 ( 0.090 ) -0.106 ( 0.337 )
I(t1 = −1) -0.116 ( 0.107 ) - ( - )
I(t1 = 1) 0.076 ( 0.118 ) -0.468 ( 0.162 )
I(t1 = 2) 0.075 ( 0.118 ) -0.594 ( 0.208 )
I(t1 = 3) 0.073 ( 0.118 ) -0.569 ( 0.176 )
I(t1 = 4) 0.059 ( 0.114 ) -0.449 ( 0.190 )
I(t1 = 5) 0.057 ( 0.114 ) -0.464 ( 0.177 )
I(t1 = 6) 0.075 ( 0.114 ) -0.476 ( 0.172 )
I(t1 = 7) 0.059 ( 0.110 ) -0.510 ( 0.167 )
I(t1 = 8) 0.065 ( 0.116 ) -0.512 ( 0.163 )
I(t1 = 9) 0.062 ( 0.112 ) -0.535 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 10) 0.060 ( 0.112 ) -0.536 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 11) -0.074 ( 0.149 ) -0.634 ( 0.159 )
I(t1 = 12) 0.055 ( 0.107 ) -0.589 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 13) -0.019 ( 0.111 ) -0.588 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 14) 0.081 ( 0.104 ) -0.572 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 15) -0.078 ( 0.149 ) -0.581 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 16) 0.079 ( 0.103 ) -0.581 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 17) -0.054 ( 0.125 ) -0.580 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 18) -0.062 ( 0.149 ) -0.652 ( 0.165 )
I(t1 = 19) 0.063 ( 0.108 ) -0.584 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 20) 0.007 ( 0.127 ) -0.575 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 21) 0.058 ( 0.108 ) -0.576 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 22) 0.053 ( 0.107 ) -0.577 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 23) 0.006 ( 0.108 ) -0.571 ( 0.152 )
I(t1 = 24) 0.003 ( 0.120 ) -0.535 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 25) 0.011 ( 0.114 ) -0.533 ( 0.153 )
<continued on next page>
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Table 11: Coefficient estimates <continued>
Combined Effect Incremental Effect of JC
Start of Evaluation: Two Month after Two Month after
Start Month of Sequence Start Month of JC
Variable Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
I(t1 = 26) 0.014 ( 0.118 ) -0.537 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 27) -0.035 ( 0.121 ) -0.537 ( 0.153 )
I(t1 = 28) 0.058 ( 0.109 ) -0.538 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 29) 0.061 ( 0.109 ) -0.537 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 30) -0.058 ( 0.133 ) -0.538 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 31) 0.063 ( 0.107 ) -0.610 ( 0.165 )
I(t1 = 32) 0.066 ( 0.110 ) -0.539 ( 0.156 )
I(t1 = 33) 0.064 ( 0.109 ) -0.626 ( 0.158 )
I(t1 = 34) -0.028 ( 0.121 ) -0.594 ( 0.154 )
I(t1 = 35) 0.012 ( 0.115 ) -0.598 ( 0.155 )
I(t1 = 36) 0.050 ( 0.108 ) -0.615 ( 0.156 )
AD:τ -1.04E-03 ( 4.97E-03 ) -4.16E-02 ( 1.61E-02 )
AD:τ2 -3.15E-05 ( 5.08E-05 ) 2.65E-04 ( 1.04E-04 )
PO:τ -1.33E-03 ( 6.70E-03 ) 2.92E-02 ( 7.02E-03 )
PO:τ2 1.04E-05 ( 7.64E-05 ) -2.27E-01 ( 3 .602536E-04 )
Variables as deviation from their mean value over all treated:
Age 35–44 -3.26E-02 ( 4.70E-02 ) - ( - )
Age 45–50 -1.31E-02 ( 5.81E-02 ) -2.13E-01 ( 8.14E-02 )
Halberstadt -5.15E-02 ( 7.68E-02 ) 4.53E-01 ( 1.11E-01 )
Halle -5.17E-02 ( 1.16E-01 ) 4.29E-01 ( 1.37E-01 )
Magdeburg -2.09E-02 ( 4.68E-02 ) 3.89E-01 ( 8.11E-02 )
Merseburg -7.97E-02 ( 6.90E-02 ) 1.61E-01 ( 7.59E-02 )
Sangerhausen -4.35E-03 ( 5.11E-02 ) 3.15E-01 ( 7.61E-02 )
Stendal -8.06E-02 ( 8.23E-02 ) 3.47E-01 ( 1.56E-01 )
Wittenberg -9.75E-02 ( 7.19E-02 ) 5.02E-01 ( 1.14E-01 )
Skilled Worker -1.34E-01 ( 7.43E-02 ) -4.80E-01 ( 1.09E-01 )
Craftsman -9.86E-02 ( 1.25E-01 ) - ( - )
Technical college -2.07E-01 ( 1.12E-01 ) - ( - )
University education -1.29E-01 ( 8.24E-02 ) - ( - )
Female skilled worker -3.71E-02 ( 5.94E-02 ) 5.56E-01 ( 1.50E-01 )
Craftswoman - ( - ) - ( - )
Female and technical college -2.24E-03 ( 9.76E-02 ) - ( - )
Female and university education -5.84E-03 ( 5.37E-02 ) -1.29E-01 ( 5.93E-02 )
Incremental Effect of JC with conventional, heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors
due to insufficient number of observations.
AD: Ashenfelter’s Dip ≡ I(−ad(τ) ≤ t1 < 0)
PO: After end of program ≡ I(t1 > 0)
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